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ABSTRACT 
 
The origin of the Indonesian military has its roots in the local militia forces (Pembela 
Tanah Air—PETA) formed by Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) during WWII.  The Indonesian 
soldiers recruited into PETA units formed the nucleus of what eventually became the Indonesian 
National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia —TNI).  However, while the importance of 
the PETA experience to the Indonesian military's formation is widely acknowledged, there has 
been little scholarship examining the nature of the training imparted, and how that foundational 
experience shaped the subsequent nature of the TNI.  The profound influence of the IJA on the 
PETA soldiers resulted in a distinct military institutional culture that became ingrained during 
the Indonesian revolution, and further developed during subsequent decades of internal, counter-
insurgency conflict.   
 This thesis traces that line between PETA and the modern TNI, and argues that many of 
the TNI's historically problematic characteristics have their roots during the PETA period.  The 
study begins by examining the background of the formation of PETA, focusing on the nature of 
the training, especially in comparison to the Japanese Army's doctrine of that period.  This is 
followed by an exploration of the role and influence of PETA-trained Indonesian officers on the 
formation and early years of the TNI, and how the PETA ethos became institutionalized in the 
military.  In particular, a "scorched earth," guerrilla warfare mentality became central to the 
TNI's identity.  By the beginning of the New Order, the PETA generation of officers had been 
firmly in control of nearly all the leadership positions in the TNI for two decades.  It was this 
cohort that led the TNI through the two bloodiest post-independence events in Indonesian 
history: the 1965-66 killings, and the 1975 invasion and occupation of East Timor.  
 This thesis uses East Timor as a case study to demonstrate the enduring influence of the 
TNI's institutional culture.  By 1975, most of the PETA generation officers in the TNI had retired 
and were no longer an active influence.  The Timor case is also unique as the TNI's only large-
scale, conventional military operation in a foreign territory, in contrast to its long history of 
internal conflicts.  The TNI had also seemingly modernized, adopting much of U.S. and Western 
military doctrine and equipment.  Yet, despite these outward changes, the TNI's actions in East 
Timor reveal an institutional culture still rooted in its PETA-era origins, and highlight the effects 
of deeply ingrained norms of "scorched earth" violence.  The thesis concludes that the TNI's 
military institutional culture, which was repeatedly reinforced through decades of internal state 
violence, was both expressed and re-inculcated in the TNI's invasion and occupation of East 
Timor, perpetuating the institutional culture into a new generation.   
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INTRODUCTION 	  
 The origins of the Indonesian military lie in the local militia forces formed by the 
Japanese Army during World War II called the Pembela Tanah Air—PETA.  The Indonesian 
soldiers recruited into PETA units formed the nucleus of what eventually became the Indonesian 
National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia—TNI).  However, while the importance of 
the PETA period to the Indonesian military’s formation is widely acknowledged,1 there has been 
little scholarship examining the nature of the training imparted, and how this foundational 
experience shaped the subsequent outcome of the TNI.  Many writers of Indonesian history, 
while recognizing the role of the Japanese in fostering Indonesian nationalism, describe the 
PETA experience as a relatively discrete event, largely unconnected to the subsequent events in 
the military’s history after its official founding.  Yet, most of the Indonesian soldiers who 
became the core of the TNI’s founding leadership, and who remained in power for decades after 
independence, had a shared background in PETA.  What seems missing is a link in scholarship 
between the importance of the PETA experience at the moment of the TNI’s genesis, and the 
course of the TNI’s development through subsequent decades.    
 This thesis will attempt to trace that line between PETA and the modern TNI, and to 
argue that many of the TNI’s problematic characteristics today have their roots during the PETA 
period.  Specifically, that the PETA experience was a primary influence on the development of 
the military institutional culture of the TNI, which shaped the organization and its members’ 
perspective and behavior.  Thus, while the TNI soon after Indonesian independence began a 
process of “rationalization” and adopted many of the features of Western militaries, I argue that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     1 Among the many scholars who have written on PETA: Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution; Joyce 
Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia; Nugroho Notosusanto.   
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its underlying culture was still rooted in the guerrilla warfare mentality formed during its PETA 
days.   
 The persistence of this military institutional culture has many causes, but three are of 
particular importance.  The first is the youth of the post-war TNI leadership cohort, many of who 
had been roughly 20-year old platoon or company commanders in PETA prior to the Japanese 
surrender.  This young cohort occupied the top levels of leadership for decades after 
independence, through and beyond the invasion and occupation of East Timor.  The second is the 
consolidation of the TNI’s institutional culture through the elimination of competing factions, 
both military and civilian.  While PETA-trained officers as a whole were the largest group and 
formed the core of the early TNI leadership, they were by no means unified, and competing 
alongside and with other factions of military and civilian elites.  The process of consolidation 
and elimination of competing factions was a long one, highlighted historically by the September 
30 coup attempt and the subsequent 1965-66 killings, in which a significant portion of the officer 
corps was purged concurrent to the larger national massacre.  Finally, the nascent institutional 
culture born from the formative experience of PETA was repeatedly reinforced through 
participation in brutal guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare.  From the revolution to the post-
independence counterinsurgency campaigns, the 1965-66 killings to the invasion and occupation 
of East Timor, these experiences inoculated the TNI’s military culture against change.   
 This study begins by examining the background of the formation of PETA, focusing on 
the nature of the training, especially in comparison to the Japanese Army’s doctrine and military 
culture of that period.  The training and framework that the Japanese left behind in PETA at the 
end of World War II, and then forged during the independence struggle, formed a central 
element in the development of the Indonesian military institutional culture.  The thesis will then 
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examine the role of PETA-trained officers in the early years of the TNI and the 
institutionalization of the PETA influence on the military culture.  By the beginning of the New 
Order, this generation of officers was firmly in control of nearly all the senior leadership 
positions in the TNI.  Next, the thesis will show why PETA influence endured in the TNI’s 
institutional culture by examining how the PETA experience is reflected in the TNI’s 
philosophy, organization, and doctrine; and the discrepancy between its professed values and 
actual behaviors.  Finally, the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor will serve as a 
critical case study of the TNI’s institutional culture and its expression in a national-level military 
operation.   
 Some caveats are in order.  There is, of course, significant danger in studying the 
supposed “sources” of a culture, particularly when suggesting a transmission of values from one 
cultural group to another.  Similarities and intriguing coincidences do not demonstrate causal 
relationships.  One may also argue that the Indonesian military might have developed many of 
the same characteristics even if the Japanese had not formed PETA units.  Additionally, since 
PETA was essentially the beginnings of the TNI, there is no pre-PETA Indonesian military for 
comparison.  What this thesis demonstrates, then, is not proof, but rather connections and 
influences.  While it cannot definitively be said that the PETA experience caused the post-war 
TNI to develop as it did, a convincing argument can be made that PETA introduced many 
important and enduring influences.  Because this thesis is more narrowly concerned with the 
aspects of Indonesia’s military institutional culture that derive from PETA influences, rather than 
a comprehensive analysis of TNI culture, many well-known characteristics of the TNI (such as 
bapak-ism and corruption, for example) are not explored or only briefly mentioned.  However, 
by focusing on an understanding of the roots of TNI culture, as opposed to its contemporary 
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features, this thesis intends to provide a different perspective on many of the TNI’s problematic 
attributes, which have often seemed contradictory, ambiguous, and confusing.     
 
Understanding Military Institutional Culture 
 I define military institutional culture as a description of the set of values, norms, and 
assumptions that guides the behavior of a military and its members.  This culture is developed 
through shared history and shared experiences, and deeply embedded over time.   
 Using and defining a phrase such as “military institutional culture” can be precarious 
because its component words (and their various combinations) are loaded with a multitude of 
meanings that can vary depending on context and application.  The concept of “culture” alone is 
fraught, and further complicated by applying it to the military as a specific organization that 
possesses its own sociology and culture.  Part of the difficulty is that a concept such as “military 
culture” can be approached from numerous perspectives and lies at the intersection of several 
academic disciplines, so that there is not yet a consensus on what military culture means.2  My 
approach has been to try to identify the areas of common agreement in the scholarship on 
military culture that is applicable to the focus of this thesis.  However, even among the scholars 
referenced for this thesis, each used the concept in related but different ways.   
 Much of the recent scholarship on military culture takes Edgar Schein’s work on 
organizational culture as a broad theoretical framework that can be applied to the study of the 
military, and I also follow this lead.  Schein’s formulation, originally developed as a way to 
analyze the behavior of organizations in the field of business, is particularly salient because it 
offers a clear distinction between expressed and unconscious motivations.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     2 For a comprehensive review of the major approaches and literature on military culture, see Winslow. 
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 Schein defines culture as:  
(a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a 
given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, 
therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, 
think, and feel in relation to those problems (“Organizational” 111). 
In other words, “culture is what a group learns over a period of time as that group solves its 
problems of survival in an external environment and its problems of internal integration.  Such 
learning is simultaneously a behavioral, cognitive, and an emotional process…the deepest level 
of culture will be the cognitive in that the perceptions, language, and thought processes that a 
group comes to share will be the ultimate causal determinant of feelings, attitudes, espoused 
values, and overt behavior” (111). 
 Schein further identified three basic levels of culture: “observable artifacts, values, and 
basic underlying assumptions” (111).  Artifacts are the overt, visible, “palpable” level of culture, 
often material or physical.  In the military context, artifacts would include uniforms, disciplinary 
rules, ceremonies, traditions and rituals, but also symbols, histories, and myths.   
 The second level, values, is “a culture’s espoused and documented values, norms, 
ideologies, charters, and philosophies” (111).  These are what an organization professes to 
believe as characteristics of its identity and the basis for its actions, and in a military context 
would include things such as professional ethos, creeds, and doctrines.  However, as Isabel Hull 
points out in her study of Imperial German military culture leading up to World War I, “Not only 
is it common for individual and organizational behavior to contradict stated beliefs, it is common 
for individuals and organizations to deny the discrepancy” (Hull 95).   
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 This leads to the necessity of probing the third and most important level of culture, basic 
underlying assumptions.  These deeper, largely unconscious norms and beliefs structure 
organizations and members’ “perceptions of their own essence and purpose, of the problems they 
must solve, and of the ways they should solve them” and are the true determinants of behavior 
(96).  Hull, for example, offers a pair of corollary basic assumptions held by the Imperial 
German Army that had significant consequences for its tendency towards “absolute destruction”: 
that war was always existential, and thus “unlimited” in nature; and that “civilians were a 
legitimate target of war” (124).  Basic underlying assumptions are imbedded particularly deeply 
because such norms are often formed in response to critical incidents, or through a process of 
“trauma-learning” (Schein, “Organizational” 115; “Culture” 19-20).  Organizations, as well as 
people, tend to institutionalize implicit lessons from extreme experiences, particularly those 
where survival is at stake (Hull 96; Schein, “Organizational” 115; Johnston 35-36).  However, 
there is no guarantee that the lessons internalized are the correct ones, or ones that will be valid 
for future problems.  And due to their typically unconscious nature, problematic assumptions can 
be difficult to identify and correct, even when they contradict overt values, leading to irrational 
and dysfunctional behavior by an organization at odds with its own welfare (Hull 92).    
 Naturally, the culture of a military or any organization is almost never homogenous.  
More typically, there are a number of sub-cultures, fragmentations, and factions within the same 
army that represent a range of beliefs, and norms can sometimes conflict (Wilson 18; Snider 
125).  The level of cohesiveness is a primary indicator of the strength of the prevailing culture, 
and the “extent its personnel think and act in ways distinct from other members of their society” 
(Wilson 18).  Furthermore, like any organization, the military is continually inducting new 
members drawn from the larger society, creating natural pressure for evolution (Schein, 
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“Organizational” 116).  The nature of the institutional culture determines the degree to which it 
resists these changes.   
 
Primary Factors Influencing Development of a Military’s Institutional Culture 
 Some scholars have attempted to identify a set of universal elements of military culture, 
as a means of enabling comparison between different armies (cf. Snider; Wilson; James Burk as 
cited in Winslow 27).  Universal characteristics tend necessarily to be vague.  While perhaps 
useful in other cases, my primary purpose is not comparative but rather to identify specific 
characteristics within one specific army, and trace their lineage and development over time.  
 While not all armies share the same cultural characteristics, all armies do have a culture 
and a relationship to its own history and the society that created it.  Largely adapting from Hull, I 
identify six main factors (of her original seven) influencing the development of military culture 
in the context of the TNI3: 
1) Mission:  Generally speaking, any military’s primary task and purpose is the 
organization and control of mass violence for the achievement of national aims.  
However, armies do acquire other tasks that may or may not be related to its 
primary mission.   The way an army interprets its mission becomes an element of 
culture, either expressed overtly through doctrine or implicitly through underlying 
assumptions.   
2) The military’s place in, and relationship to state and society:  How the military 
sees its role as an element of national power; and itself in relation to the 
government and to society.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     3 Adapted from Hull.  The sixth factor on her list of seven is “gender constituency,” which is not relevant for the 
purpose of this thesis. 
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3) The military’s structure and organization: This refers to both internal 
organization, as well as the physical disposition of forces.  This is somewhat 
reflective of the first, “Mission,” since armies tend to be organized to accomplish 
its primary goals.  However, this factor was particularly important during the 
formation of the TNI, since the military more or less inherited the territorial 
structure left behind by the Japanese.   
4) The military’s social base:  The socio-economic class and background of 
members of the military, as well as the norms of its members prior to their entry 
into the military. 
5) The military’s resources:  Not only funding, equipment and technology, but 
access to education and training.   
6) Past history:  Especially the military’s most recent war, or in the case of the 
Indonesian military, its foundational independence struggle. (98) 
 In the TNI’s case, its formative PETA identity—as both a revolutionary guerrilla army 
and the first professionally trained all-Indonesian force—imbued its members with a sense of 
eliteness as the chosen “defenders of the homeland.”  After achieving independence, this identity 
led the PETA-dominated army to assert its right to an increasingly active role in the governance 
of the nation, at odds with the civilian elites.  Much of this conflict was class based.  Although as 
a group PETA recruits tended to be well educated relative to the general population, an 
enormous gap existed between them and the civilian elites, who were generally members of the 
privileged and highly educated urban elite.  The military’s constant conflict with civilians in the 
government developed into a deep distrust of both civilian authority and political instability.   
	   9 
 The TNI was structured territorially, in accordance with its primary missions of national 
defense via guerrilla warfare, and internal security or counter-guerrilla operations.  This 
organization also reflected the military’s general lack of resources, which required the military to 
rely on civilian assets, whether through cooperation or coercion.  Lack of technologically 
advanced weaponry, relatively rudimentary training, and a perspective on war conditioned by 
guerrilla warfare meant that the TNI did not hold distinguishing combatants and civilians as an 
imperative.  Finally, the TNI’s foundational experience in a brutal guerrilla war against the 
Dutch ingrained norms of extreme violence that persisted even after its mission turned to internal 
security.  Repeated conflicts against separatist rebellions reinforced both the military culture of 
“scorched earth” violence, and the military’s growing obsession with instability.  These tensions 
erupted in 1965, when, in the wake of a failed Communist-led coup attempt, the military 
unleashed a nation-wide purge of suspected Communists that led to the establishment of the 
military-dominated New Order regime.  This culture of “scorched earth” violence and obsession 
with insecurity surfaced again less than a decade later, in the Indonesian invasion and occupation 
of East Timor.   
 This thesis consists of four chapters.  The first chapter will begin with an examination of 
the Imperial Japanese Army leading up to the Second World War—its training, structure, and 
military culture—as a background to understanding those influences in PETA and as a basis for 
comparison.  The formation of PETA will then be explored, along with the organization’s 
structure, training, and intended role as an auxiliary guerrilla force.  This chapter lays the 
foundation for tracing the line of influence from the IJA to PETA to the Indonesian Army.   
 Chapter two examines the formation of the Indonesian Army in the crucible of the war 
for independence, and the institutionalization of the PETA ethos.  Led mostly by PETA-trained 
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officers and soldiers, the Indonesian Army naturally absorbed and amplified their influence.  The 
revolutionary nationalist spirit of the PETA officers came to define the entire generation of 
freedom fighters.  The guerrilla warfare mentality of the PETA cohort also became the core of 
the military’s identity, entrenched by the experience of the revolution and subsequent campaigns 
to suppress regional rebellions in the post-independence period.  The PETA ideology was 
captured in General Abdul Haris Nasution’s Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare (Pokok-pokok 
Gerilya), which became the basis of TNI doctrine by the advent of the New Order.  These 
characteristics were at odds with the outlook of the civilian elites and Dutch-trained Indonesians 
in the government, and the resulting friction reinforced the PETA-dominated military’s sense of 
superiority and entitlement.    
 The third chapter explores the TNI’s institutional culture in greater depth.  After decades 
of nearly constant guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare, the TNI had developed and ingrained an 
institutional culture rooted in the PETA generation’s values.  Despite rapid modernization, the 
TNI’s core culture remained the same.  In large part, this was because the youth of the PETA 
leaders upon independence allowed them to dominate the leadership of the TNI for more than 
three decades.  But the TNI’s numerous campaigns of internal suppression also cemented a 
culture of unbounded violence, rooted in the PETA-era guerrilla warfare mindset.  This was 
brought to a terrible climax in the 1965-66 killings that ushered in the New Order, which also 
brought the military to its dominant position in the government.   
 The fourth and final chapter deals with the Indonesian military’s invasion and occupation 
of East Timor.  East Timor serves as a useful case study because, by 1975, most of the PETA 
generation leaders had left the military except at the highest echelons.  The TNI had adopted 
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military.  Yet, the TNI’s actions in East Timor belie that facade, and reveal an institutional 
culture that had perpetuated into a new generation.  The devastation and violence perpetrated in 
East Timor was simply another expression of the “spirit of destruction” that traced its roots back 
to the TNI’s foundation in PETA.  
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CHAPTER 1 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PETA 
 
 The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), upon its arrival in Indonesia in 1942, was a 
fascinating study in military contradiction.  One the one hand, it was an army that was feared and 
respected for the superb discipline, tactics, and remarkable bravery of its soldiers.  On the other, 
this same army only a few years earlier had been responsible for unleashing, at Nanking, one of 
the worst atrocities conducted by any military in the 20th century, and was on its way to several 
more such incidents before the war’s end.  It had thoroughly adopted modern military 
organization, tactics, and equipment, making it comparable to contemporary European armies.  
And yet despite the outward trappings of a professional Western military, the IJA possessed a 
troubling institutional culture at odds with its professed modernity.    
 Comparing the TNI with the Japanese Army, its primary progenitor, reveals an 
interesting contrast in two new nations’ attempts to form modern militaries.  Their respective 
histories are filled with many parallels that suggest that they are causally linked.  For example, 
did the aspects of the IJA’s culture underlying its actions at Nanking, and its brutal treatment of 
prisoners and civilians during the war, suffuse into the PETA recruits an “institutional culture of 
terror” (Robinson, Genocide 46), which later manifest itself in two of the largest mass killings of 
the post-World War II era?  The possible sources of both armies’ behavior have been debated at 
length, and the foundations of such behavior are too complex to reduce to a single definitive 
cause.  In the PETA case, there is no evidence in existing records (to the author’s knowledge) 
that the Japanese ever inculcated such training, and official Japanese policy disavowed such 
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actions.  And there is certainly a danger in identifying a historical outcome and then 
“discovering” evidence in research that supports a specific teleological theory of the cause.   
 But it is impossible to maintain that the IJA had no influence at all on the TNI.  The 
hidden beliefs and the deeper underlying assumptions of an institutional culture take root not just 
through conscious learning, but also through unconscious levels of influence and modeling.  
Thus, the entirety of what was taught to Indonesian soldiers cannot be deduced from simply 
looking at PETA training schedules, programs of instruction, drill manuals, or even interviews 
with ex-soldiers.  When examining the roots of the culture of the TNI, the cultures of the 
influencing bodies must also be examined, in this case the IJA.   
 This is not to suggest other influences on the TNI should be ignored, or to assert that 
parallels constitute irrevocable proof.  Nonetheless, I argue here that IJA military culture must 
have had an impact on the PETA soldiers, in the way that any significant colonial encounter 
etched an indelible mutual imprint on both parties.  And specifically, as the creators of the first 
professionally-trained, all-Indonesian military force, the IJA’s influence—overt as well as 
latent—haunted the development of the TNI.  With that in mind, a brief examination of the 
nature of the Army that the Japanese brought to Indonesia may help illuminate what was passed 
on.   
 
The Imperial Japanese Army 
 By the end of the 19th century, Japan had been long closed off but not blind to 
developments in the world, even prior to the arrival of Perry and the Convention of Kanagawa in 
1854.  Among the many modernizing reforms resulting from the Meiji Restoration was the 
establishment of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) in 1871.  The creation of a modern national 
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military effectively ended the feudal system that had sustained the warrior class of samurai.  But 
although “the new government could legislate the warrior class out of existence,” especially with 
the establishment of national conscription in 1873, the new military’s leadership was largely 
drawn from this same group, and “it did not displace the value system which had sustained it” 
(Humphreys 29).   
 The IJA’s leadership enthusiastically adopted a Western military model, initially based 
on the system of the French, who set up Japan’s first military academies and educational 
institutions.  However, after German successes in the Franco-Prussian War, the Japanese became 
enamored with the Prussian model and the “total war” doctrine of the Imperial German Army.4  
Beyond the effectiveness of Prussian mobility-based tactics, IJA leaders embraced the idea that 
“military power...[did not] rest . . . solely on a head count of soldiers, nor even on the technical 
attributes of their weaponry, but on a ‘remarkable trinity’ of government, army, and people, each 
with an equal contribution to make. This was the ‘nation-in-arms,’ a society molded to sacrifice 
everything willingly for the sake of the nation when the call came” (Harries 39).   
 Actively seeking to establish itself as a world power, Japan deployed its forces in several 
major actions in the army’s first decades.  These included the first Sino-Japanese War and the 
international suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, and culminated in the Russo-Japanese War.  
Although the effectiveness of its tactics was questionable at times, particularly against vastly 
superior Russian weaponry that inflicted massive losses, these campaigns were considered 
national successes that brought the IJA international esteem as a modern, professional military 
(Drea, Japan 99, 104).  Of particular note, Japanese soldiers drew approbation from Western 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     4 See Isabel Hull, Absolute Destruction, for an account of Imperial German Army's military culture and the 
development of its total war doctrine. 
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observers for their discipline, restraint, and humane treatment of prisoners (Drea, Japan 120; 
Harries 96).5   
 After largely sitting out of the First World War the Japanese Army stagnated, and 
tensions between military leaders and the civilian administration rose in conjunction with severe 
cuts to the army’s size and budget.  The loss of prestige and funding initiated an effort among 
many elements in the army to increasingly militarize Japanese society.  Military leaders managed 
to institute a national system of required military training education in public schools 
(seinendan), along with a national army reserve system that functioned down to the village level, 
which systematically and thoroughly established the military as a dominant social institution.  
More than simply providing physical training and military drills, the education emphasized 
patriotic and military values based on the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors, “so that the 
army’s...ideals became an important layer of the rural value system” (Smethurst xv).  The 
radicalization of the officer corps also manifested itself in the creation of numerous secret 
organizations advocating varying degrees of increased military dominance in government and 
society, alongside vehement anti-Westernism.  This increased militarism, combined with Japan’s 
resource deficiency, led to the Manchurian Incident and the re-engagement of hostilities with 
China, eventually resulting in the second Sino-Japanese War and Japan’s entry into World War 
II.    
 A critical development in institutionalizing this militarism was the Kwangtung Army, 
which had been Japan’s permanent territorial army in Manchuria since the end of the Russo-
Japanese War in 1905.  The Kwantung Army was largely autonomous from central government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     5 From Soldiers of the Sun: “What most immediately impressed all Western observers about the Japanese soldier 
was the fanatical bravery and utter disregard for personal safety, which seemed at once admirable and sinister to the 
Occidental.  But in this war the Japanese soldier was also seen as magnanimous—generous in his respect for brave 
enemies and chivalrous in his treatment of their casualties” (96). 
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control, and its leaders often acted of their own initiative and sometimes in violation of orders.6  
The establishment of the Manchukuo government in 1932, which was directly administered by 
the Kwantung Army, strengthened this independence from civilian oversight.  As the IJA’s only 
forward-deployed element, assignment to this unit was prestigious and much of the Japan’s 
military leadership during World War II had rotated through the Kwangtung Army at some point 
during the inter-war period.  This common experience in three decades of largely autonomous, 
low-intensity conflict in China would be an important factor later in aspects of IJA military 
culture that would emerge during World War II. 
 
IJA Structure and Training 
 Much of the IJA’s organizational structure resulted from the unique adaptation of the 
military to its financial and resource constraints at the same time it was also trying to modernize.  
The result was an especially infantry-focused army that espoused “fighting spirit” over 
technology or firepower.7  The Japanese doctrine was “weighted heavily on the intangible factors 
of infantry in battle,” reinforcing “a consistent theme in Japanese military thought that infantry, 
properly led and motivated, can overcome the material advantages of the foe” (Drea, Essays 63).  
This naturally led to a heavy emphasis in training and education on small unit infantry tactics and 
the development of seishin, or spirit.   
 Japanese infantry training was rigorous by any military’s standard, with heavy doses of 
physical training, long forced marches, and battle drills in all terrains and environments.  
Training emphasized conditioning for hardness and resiliency, and was reinforced constantly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     6 Numerous incidents of unsanctioned military action by Kwantung Army elements include the Huanggutun 
incident and the Manchurian (Mukden) incident, among many other minor actions (Drea Japan, chapter 9). 
     7 As an example of the emphasis on infantry: IJA was roughly 40-50% infantry during World War II, compared 
to the U.S. Army’s combined arms focused units, which were about 20-25% infantry (cf. Drea, Essays 63) 
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through corporal punishment.  The lack of resources and equipment facilitated the focus on basic 
soldiering skills and fieldcraft, and taught soldiers to survive for extended periods without 
logistical support.  Above all, soldiers were continually inculcated with an aggressive tactical 
attitude stressing the offense, in what was termed the “spirit of the bayonet” (Daughtery 29).   
 This “philosophy of lack,” in which absence of technology and resources was virtuized 
from a weakness to a strength, made the training excellent preparation for the kind of jungle 
fighting that characterized the Pacific war.8  The mobile, small-unit based, self-sufficient 
character of the army was ideally suited for conducting an irregular or guerrilla warfare 
campaign.   
 The corollary to this kind of warfighting philosophy is that “Japanese officers were 
imbued with the spirit of the offensive at the expense of sound campaign and logistics planning” 
(Drea, Essays 69).  The obsession with offensive spirit and infantry tactics was present in a 
perverse disregard for operational design and strategy even at the highest levels of military 
policy making in the government:  “Rhetoric about national defense planning and transcendental 
civilian cabinets aside, in mid-1937 there was no integrated national defense strategy.  There was 
no coherent and realistic rearmament plan.  There was no joint operational planning.  Nothing 
linked doctrine, operations, military budgets, hypothetical opponents, or future war” (Drea, 
Japan 189).   
 In nearly all militaries, the staff college has historically been the pinnacle of a modern 
military’s officer professional education, designed to transition officers from thinking tactically 
to strategically, and train them in the critical thinking and conceptual skills needed to direct and 
coordinate the whole of an army’s elements and functions at higher levels of command.  In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     8 This is despite the fact that IJA infantry training was doctrinally geared towards fighting against the Russians in 
Siberia.   
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IJA’s case, however, the staff college was almost entirely focused on infantry tactics and rote 
memorization: 
Even at Staff College, the pinnacle of the army educational edifice, open only to 
the select few, notions of initiative, creativity, originality, and individual force of 
character were stifled. At what was effectively the university for the Imperial 
Army’s intellectual elite, the generals of the future, there was no real preparation 
for leadership.  There was no general discussion, no attempt to make the students 
talk freely, just more learning by rote—and this for men of thirty to thirty-five, 
few of them below the rank of captain. When asked a question in class, the Staff 
College student “immediately sat at attention and shouted ‘Sir!’, firmly grasping 
each side of the chair on which he sat—and fixing his eyes on the small of the 
back of the person immediately in front of him, he proceeded to bawl out at the 
top of his voice what appeared to be a carefully prepared answer” (Harries 174).9 
 
IJA Culture 
 While the IJA adopted the tactics, equipment, and organization of Western militaries, its 
organizational culture was drawn from pre-existing Japanese social values that were adapted to 
meet the needs of the military.  Drea writes that: 
Training methods of the Imperial Army did instill those values—leadership, 
interdependence, and cohesion—so highly prized by military leaders.  They did 
this by building upon the existing values of the society, especially the creation of 
a surrogate family. To be sure, the prewar Imperial Japanese Army certainly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Harries' source is the Papers of the British War Office in the Public Records Office, Kew, London: WO 
208/1429, January 1937 Report.   
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adopted Western forms of organization, uniform, rank structure, military 
education, and modern weaponry, along with the associated modem tools of 
warfare. It did not, however, attempt to impose either a Western or a modern 
model on the social structure inside the barracks (“Barracks” 71).   
The “traditional values” that military leaders sought to inculcate were those of rural Japanese 
village society, which—during this period of rapid transition to modernity—military leaders 
feared were being eroded and threatened by the influx of “mass movements and Western 
ideologies” such as liberalism, internationalism, parliamentarianism, and other primarily urban 
trends that were sweeping the world (Smethurst xv).10  As Japanese society quickly became more 
educated, industrialized, and thus increasingly diverse and socially mobile, military leaders 
developed an obsessive fear of national disunity (23).   
 The military reinforced its values by establishing a system of national military reserves 
and local youth military organizations to complement conscription down to the village level.  
Conscripts and officers would return to their hometowns after their service and enter the 
reserves, subsequently leading local youth organizations and providing mandatory instruction to 
school children in military values and skills.  Thus, by the time a soldier actually entered into 
official military service at the advent of Japan’s entry into World War II, he had received 
training on “how to use a bayonet, throw a grenade, fire a rifle, machine gun, and mortar, how to 
march in a unit and to attack, and how to scout, use a map and compass, and give first aid” and 
had been indoctrinated with the “basic information necessary for a good soldier and militarized 
citizen” from the time he was 13 or 14 years old (155).   
 Japanese military leaders also exploited the cohesive and cooperative elements of rural 
village life.  The funding for the militarized local organizations came from the community, not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     10 For “Japanese traditional values,” see also Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, 1946.   
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the national government, reinforcing each village’s financial and psychological sense of 
investment in the military.  Responsibilities for civic services such as fire departments were 
given to local military reserve units, so that the line between civil and military functions often 
disappeared.  Furthermore, the army “inducted draftees into the barracks based on the area of 
their homes of record,” so that members of a given infantry unit were drawn from the same 
“regimental districts” and would often serve with officers and fellow soldiers of similar 
backgrounds (Drea, Essays 79-80).  Thus, the village basis of military service created a structure 
for conflating and integrating the military’s ideals with the rural value system, such that “by the 
1930s . . . loyalty to the army and loyalty to the hamlet and village had become synonymous” 
(Smethurst xvi).  
 The IJA also relied heavily on two other traditions to “connect past to present when 
formulating national values” (Drea, Japan 31).  The first was absolute loyalty to the emperor, the 
paramount soldierly obligation and the apex of national concentric circles of family, loyalty, and 
duty.  The special relationship between the soldier and the emperor was embodied in the Imperial 
Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors.  Issued in 1882 following a rebellion, and intended to 
promulgate the “traditional samurai values“ of the soldier and his loyalty to the emperor, the 
Rescript became the most important basis of the military’s ideology.  The Rescript was seen as a 
transcendent document that was presented directly to the army by the emperor, and carried a 
“religious aura” of spiritual duty (Harries 25).  Because of this direct transmission, and because it 
also predated the 1889 Constitution, the military believed that the Rescript “placed the army and 
the navy in a position subordinate only to the emperor and not the civil government,” 
concomitant with a special role in the nation (Smethurst 164-65).  The rescript became required 
memorization for every soldier, and was recited continually in schools and military ceremonies.   
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 The second tradition increasingly relied upon by the IJA was a re-invention of the 
Bushido tradition that emphasized, “the transcendence the samurai achieved over his own 
mortality” (Harries 7).  The Bushido values of absolute loyalty and obedience, frugality, and the 
fulfillment of duty to the death were expressed in the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors.  
But early 20th century Japan was characterized by increasing polarization between a largely 
urban civilian government and a hardline officer corps, as well as a lack of financial and 
industrial capability to modernize the military.  In this environment, the emphasis on Bushido 
metastasized into an extremist philosophy in which seishin was more important than material.  
This fed well into an anti-Western, anti-materialistic attitude of elements in the army, which 
seized upon the re-formulated Bushido ethic as the soul of the national character.  This 
eventually evolved into “a range of mental attitudes that bordered on psychopathy: a view of 
death as sublime and beautiful . . . [and] surrender as the ultimate dishonor, a belief whose 
corollary was total contempt for the captive; reverence for the sword, inherited directly from the 
samurai, which gave beheading as a punishment a special mystical significance” (Harries 481).  
This is not to say that Japanese soldiers were psychopathic, but rather that this formulation of 
Bushido values was increasingly promulgated as the institutional and public norm.  The value of 
death before dishonor slowly became an inculcated societal tenet, such that the “shame of 
captivity and its accompanying stigma of cowardice” (Drea, Japan 119) helped to ensure 
adherence to the organizational norms of behavior, in which suicide was an acceptable option.   
 The pre-World War II Japanese army was thus a complex combination of a modern, 
Western military structure laid atop a largely anti-Western, neo-traditionalist culture that 
simultaneously embraced and rejected military modernization.  The underlying culture of the 
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IJA, reinforced by social structure and radical indoctrinated philosophy, would become “the 
ghost in the modern machinery of the Imperial Japanese Army” (Harries 7).  
 
The Formation of PETA 
 Global war spread into Southeast Asia through Japan’s protracted campaign in China, 
which stretched Japan’s national resources to their limit.  In the summer of 1941, seeking to cut 
off Chiang Kai Shek’s Kuomintang Army from its last lifelines to western aid, Japan sent troops 
to occupy French Indochina.  Western powers responded by embargoing crucial raw materials 
and oil, confronting Japan with a resource crisis that committed the IJA to seizing the Southeast 
Asian colonies, the Netherland East Indies in particular (Drea, Japan 209-212).  By May 1942, 
Japan’s lightning advances across Southeast Asia had swept aside in half a year the architecture 
of more than three centuries of Western colonialism.   
 But the illusion of this strategy’s feasibility quickly faded, and successful Allied counter-
offensives exposed the IJA’s over-extended posture.  By late 1943, Japan’s deteriorating 
strategic situation in the Pacific led the Japanese Military Government in Jakarta to create an 
Indonesian militia force called the “Volunteer Army of the Defenders of the Homeland” 
(Sukarela Tentara Pembela Tahah Air, or PETA), in order to augment Japanese military forces 
in defending against an expected Allied invasion (Kanahele 116).  Although various other local 
militia and resistance groups existed throughout the archipelago, many fostered by the Japanese, 
and the IJA earlier that year had already established the Heiho system for recruiting Indonesians 
as auxiliary support soldiers, PETA represented the first professionally organized Indonesian 
military force specifically trained for combat and led by Indonesians (116).  With the core of the 
invading Japanese occupation forces having been sent to more desperate combat zones such as 
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Guadalcanal, only around 10,000 IJA soldiers remained in the Indies to defend the entire 
archipelago, only a fraction of which were actual combat troops (Oba 1-2; Kanahele 116).  The 
military exigencies facing the Japanese forces thus intersected with the increasingly urgent desire 
of Indonesians for independence and a stake in defending their land against the return of Western 
colonial forces.  These PETA recruits later formed the nucleus of what was eventually to become 
the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia —TNI).  
 
PETA Organization 
 PETA was started as an initiative of the Japanese 16th Army, which was responsible for 
Java, under the broader program of giyugun, meaning “volunteer army” (Sato 197).  Strictly 
speaking, PETA referred only to the Java Giyugun11 (Miyamoto 221).  PETA initially fell under 
the direction of the Beppan (Special Section), which was an intelligence section assigned to the 
16th Army Headquarters in Jakarta led by First Lieutenant (later Captain) Yanagawa Motoshige.  
In January 1943, the Beppan established a training center in Tanggerang and selected a small 
group of Indonesians as a test class, among them future TNI general Kemal Idris (Kanahele 117; 
Reid footnote in Miyamoto 221; Notosusanto, Peta 87).  The success of the initial pilot class led 
to the rapid expansion of the program, with an officer candidate school established in Bogor in 
the fall of 1943, and the organization of the PETA into battalion (daidan) sized elements 
(Kanahele 123).  The initial Jawa Giyugun was composed of 33 daidan of 500 soldiers, each 
with three companies (chudan) of three platoons (shodan) each, for a total strength of 16,500 
Indonesians in 1944 (Miyamoto 222).  Each daidan was assigned a Japanese officer-advisor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     11 Other giyugun were established on Sumatra and Bali, each with slightly different characteristics.  The Java 
Giyugun was the largest, and the TNI has been dominated by Javanese officers since its inception. 
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supported by several Japanese NCOs.12  As more PETA units were established with trained 
commanders, the Indonesians increasingly conducted the training themselves (Sato 211).    
 Indonesian officer candidates were selected and trained for all three levels of command, 
but with significant differences in qualification requirements.  The battalion and company 
commanders were largely selected from older, well-established members of local communities 
(many of them were teachers or religious leaders), who were expected by the Japanese to be able 
to wield influence over their younger subordinates and recruit effectively in their home territories 
(Kanahele 123-24).  Commensurate with their intended role, the military training for these 
daidancho and chodancho was relatively brief and leadership focused, usually lasting only a 
couple months.  The Japanese intent for the shodancho was quite different.  These platoon 
commanders were generally selected from among young, relatively well-educated, and 
nationalistic Indonesian men.  They were given intensive military training beyond that of the 
battalion and company commanders, and were the closest to being professionally trained military 
officers (124).  It is this generation of young, educated officers that formed the “backbone of the 
revolutionary officer corps” (McVey, “Part I” 133).  Some of the particularly promising young 
Indonesian lieutenants, such as Zukifli Lubis, were selected for follow-on special intelligence 
training (Conboy, Kopassus 15-16; Notosusanto, Peta 132-35).13 
 The success of the PETA program and the popularity of the units, as well as Japanese 
concerns about Allied victories in the Pacific, spurred the creation of another Giyugun consisting 
of 22 battalions in the summer of 1944, and later an additional 12 battalions (Miyamoto 222-3).  
By the end of the war, the total PETA force on Java and Bali was 69 battalions with a combined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     12 Non-commissioned Officer 
     13 Zukifli Lubis, later the first head of the National Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Nasional—BIN), was a 
PETA contemporary of Suharto who was selected to attend an intelligence officer course in Singapore. 
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strength of approximately 38,000 Indonesian soldiers, including over 922 trained officers (Sato 
201).   
 From its inception, PETA was designed to be a territorial defense force, the design of 
which would have far reaching implications: 
Significantly, the territorial organization of Peta was to a degree determined by 
one man, the daidancho.  A battalion was located in the geographical area of his 
influence as a local leader.  Recruits were taken from the area [...].  Appeals to 
public support were to be made in his name or related to local communal loyalties 
which he might have represented.  As a consequence, once located, a battalion 
remained there almost permanently so that in time it would have become fully 
identified and integrated with the region (Kanahele 126).  
The Japanese rationale for such a territorial-based force was clear: to maximize the PETA forces’ 
advantage in guerilla warfare against a numerically and technologically superior invading enemy 
force (127).  However, also evident are the inevitable disadvantages of such a locally-based 
system: loss of overall organizational unity and discipline as each unit develops a local identity 
stronger than a national one; nepotism; distractions caused by non-military or personal matters; 
the mixing of military leadership and local politics; and the coalescing of significant power into 
the hands of a local “warlord.”  The problems arising from the territorial entrenchment of PETA 
units, and the military institutionalization of what many writers have called the Bapak-anak 
(father-son) relationship between leaders and subordinates, has been a continuous theme since 
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their beginnings in PETA (McVey, “Part I” 154-55; slightly different impression in Utrecht 
46).14 
 
PETA Training 
 Although the Japanese were not intent on creating a copy of the IJA in PETA, the 
worldview and military culture of the Japanese trainers had a significant impact on the 
Indonesian recruits.  The methodology of the training was very clearly modeled on the Japanese 
officers’ own training experiences as described earlier, and was perfect preparation for training a 
guerrilla force.  As the PETA program evolved and training became more dispersed, the quality 
of training provided by the Japanese instructor-advisors varied from unit to unit.  In spite of this, 
some common elements of the Imperial Japanese Army’s military culture of that period were 
clearly passed on to all the PETA units, the imprint of which was retained in the later TNI.   
 The Japanese training of Indonesian PETA recruits largely followed the priorities 
inherent in their own training experience, and in some cases were based directly on translated 
versions of Japanese training manuals (Miyamoto 233).  The foundational principle was that 
seishin (which was translated in Indonesian as semangat) was more important than any other 
aspect of warfare, enabling the triumph of will over the military technological advantages of the 
West (Lebra, “Significance” 222).  There also seems to have been a cultural consonance between 
Japanese military bushido ethics and Javanese culture, such as classical “wayang values,” the 
focus in Javanese mysticism on jiwa (soul), as well as the Javanese ksatria (knight) tradition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     14 Kanahele and Anderson both suggest that General Nasution's post-war Territorial Defense Doctrine may have 
been inspired by the PETA territorial organization. Nasution cites other sources of inspiration, such as the German 
wehrkreise system, which he cites repeatedly.  One might also argue that there are simply common rational military 
factors in planning for a deliberate guerrilla warfare defense against an invading force.  Nasution may also have 
been reluctant to credit the Japanese as an influence, especially since he was not a PETA officer.  However, one 
cannot escape the fact that the revolution coalesced around PETA units that were already territorially based at the 
start of the independence war. 
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(Anderson, Aspects 48; McVey, “Part I” 140; Notosusanto, Peta 69-73, 99, 142).  Additionally, 
emphasis on semangat complemented the rising nationalism that was fostered by the Japanese 
trainers.15  The self-image of the PETA soldiers, despite the reality that they were under Japanese 
control as firmly as they had been under the Dutch, was that they were the vanguard of a nascent 
independent Indonesian national army and nation (Notosusanto, Peta 114).  They “developed an 
intense pride in their training and their capabilities” and “felt they were members of a highly 
favored elite” (Jenkins, “Occupation” 71).   
 The structure and content of the training, aside from the constant emphasis on semangat, 
varied from class to class as the PETA program evolved, but generally focused on basic military 
skills with a significant dose of physical training.  According to Nugroho Notosusanto, the pilot 
PETA program led by Lieutenant Yanagawa in Tanggerang consisted of the following: 
The curriculum included general subjects (inculcation of the spirit, history of the 
Netherlands East Indies, the world situation, war history, tactics, communication, 
interior duties, etc.), special subjects (espionage, stratagem, counter-intelligence, 
propaganda, etc.), practical courses (drill, gymnastics, sumo-wrestling, 
swimming, fencing), technical courses   (shooting, reconnaissance, liaison, 
camouflage, etc.), field study (visits to farms and factories), and extracurricular 
activities like singing martial songs. (Peta 87) 
Subsequent PETA training courses modified the curriculum based on the time and resources 
available and the quality of the recruits.  In the first Bogor class, for example, training time was 
cut to two months, making it impossible to train properly well-rounded officers, so the trainers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     15 Although the Japanese role and motivation in fostering Indonesian nationalism is a matter of debate, the 
rhetoric of militant nationalism was clearly used in the training of PETA recruits (cf. Jenkins “Occupation”).  This 
was a natural by-product of the Japanese officers’ own training, which heavily emphasized the development of 
Bushido as the national character, and which would very much have been passed on by young, idealistic officers 
such as Yanagawa.   
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“concentrated on instilling fighting spirit, on teaching basic infantry skills, and on building up 
the physical strength of the cadets” (57).16    
      Figure 1: Sample Daily Curriculum of PETA Training 
 The training was intense, and mentally and physically demanding in keeping with the 
IJA’s methodology of training for toughness and development of spirit.  Training took place in 
all weather conditions and—in spite of the training schedule—could occur at any hour.  During 
the first official Bogor PETA class, for example, one Japanese trainer forced the trainees out for 
“midnight maneuvers” after a day that had already been spent training in heavy rain (Jenkins, 
“Occupation” 61).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     16 Jenkins writes that, “the Japanese did not give the any lessons on guerrilla warfare because, at the time, they 
still thought they could fight an “authentic war.”  The idea of guerrilla training came later, when the Japanese army 
began to realize it was losing the war.” This is from an interview with Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2, 1999.  
SAMPLE	  DAILY	  CURRICULUM	  OF	  PETA	  TRAINING	  A	  newspaper	  report	  gave	  the	  following	  schedule	  at	  the	  Jawa	  Bo-­‐ei	  
Giyugun	  Kanbu	  Renseitai,	  the	  PETA	  training	  center	  in	  Bogor,	  in	  1943:	  	  	  Morning	  (0900-­‐1200):	   	  1. Roll	  Call	  2. Raising	  the	  flag,	  bowing	  to	  the	  Emperor	  3. Morning	  gymnastics	  4. Breakfast	  	   1. Japanese	  language	  lessons,	  tactics,	  drill	  regulations	  2. History	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  England,	  security	  3. Daily	  etiquette	  4. Bushido	  	  Afternoon:	  1. Afternoon	  nap	  (half	  an	  hour)	  2. Health	  examination	  3. Rifle	  and	  bayonet	  exercises	  	  Evening:	  1900	   Return	  from	  field	  exercise,	  cleaning	  of	  arms	  2000	  1. Dinner	  (rice,	  tomato,	  peanuts,	  etc.)	  2. Private	  study	  3. Prayers	  	  (Adapted	  from	  Notosusanto	  1979,	  116-­‐117.	  	  His	  source	  is	  Asia	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 The physicality of the training was reinforced by corporal punishment, often conducted 
en-masse despite the error of a single man in a company.  These ranged from stress positions, 
caning, and sometimes slapping on the face, “a common practice in the Japanese army, but one 
the Indonesians found deeply humiliating” (61).  Although much has been written about the 
cultural friction resulting from some harsh Japanese training methods, especially the slapping on 
the face, Jenkins writes that many ex-PETA officers looked back on the hard training as a 
necessary method (61-62).  “Whatever the truth of the matter,” Jenkins continues, “the 
experience left a mark on some of Indonesia’s future army officers. Bashed by the Japanese, a 
number of them went on to become bashers themselves” (62).17  
 The nature of the training itself seems to have evolved as the program expanded and the 
war changed, with guerrilla warfare training playing an increasingly larger role as the likelihood 
of Japanese defeat grew (Suwondo 13).  Many graduates of the pilot course and the first Bogor 
course were selected for additional training, becoming the initial cadre of the Bo-ei Giyugun 
Tokusetsu Yugekitai, also known by its code name Iggo Kimmutai, which was “geared more 
toward ‘intelligence type’ warfare rather than ‘ordinary’ guerrilla warfare” (Notosusanto, Peta 
133).18  These men underwent six additional months of training from August to December 1944, 
in subjects including “Japanese Language, general military tactics and technique, tactics and 
technique for infantry support weapons (mortar, LMG [light machine gun]), guerilla tactics, 
theory of intelligence and territorial operations” (132).  Officially established on January 8, 1945, 
the Iggo Kummitai had the dual function of setting up further yugeki (guerrilla) branch training 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     17 Some Japanese training commanders, such as First Lieutenant Tsuchiya Kiso, forbid face slapping and other 
culturally humiliating forms of punishment, in addition to demonstrating a deep sense of professionalism and 
solidarity with the Indonesian trainees.  This made a lasting impression and earned the deep respect of the PETA 
officers.  Jenkins writes that “When Soeharto went to Japan for the first time, he asked to see Tsuchiya as his old 
trainer” (62, footnote; source is Ruth McVey interview with Tsuchiya Kiso and Yoshitake Chikao, October 1980).   
     18 Notosusanto translates the names as follows: tokusetsu = special; yugeki = guerilla; iggo (ichi go) = number 
one, but the “I” was also considered as signifying “Indonesia”; kimmu = duty 
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centers, as well as conducting intelligence collection, and “advanced force” style territorial 
operations such as emplacing caches (134-5).   
 A few PETA trainees also underwent specialized training in health and medicine, 
accounting, ordinance, or basic motorized cavalry operations (121-124).  However, no PETA 
officers received training in the command and staff functions necessary to coordinate the 
elements of a battalion or larger unit and keep it running.  While well trained specifically to fight 
a revolutionary guerrilla war using small-unit, light infantry tactics, they received no real 
professional military education at the operational level, such as complex, large-scale maneuver 
operations.  That meant that “the officers who were to form the backbone of the TNI for the best 
part of three decades had, for the time being, at least, no higher military education and were 
capable of mounting nothing more than battalion-size operations, if that.  That limitation was to 
play into the hands of officers . . . who had attended either the pre-war Royal Military Academy 
in Breda in the Netherlands or the substitute academy established in Bandung after the German 
invasion of Holland in 1940.  Not surprisingly, these officers were considered more suitable for 
senior staff and command positions in the early years of the TNI” (79).   
	  
Japanese Strategy and the Role of PETA 
 The Japanese territorial strategy for defending Java against invasion towards the end of 
the war, based on the their hard-won lessons fighting against the vastly superior firepower of the 
Allied forces, seems to have relied increasingly heavily on the role of PETA units19: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     19 There is considerable debate about the role the Japanese saw for PETA in the expected final invasion, with 
various writers having differing interpretations of Japanese motivations, and citing sometimes contradictory 
Japanese documents of the period.  This may reflect a shift in Japanese strategy, or lack of consensus within the IJA 
command, or both.  In any case, I side with the simplest explanation that the Japanese formed PETA as a guerrilla 
force to assist in the defense against invasion, and intended to use them as such.   
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Their revised strategy was therefore to have a three-tiered coastal defence.  The 
outer ring, nearest the coast [...] would bear the brunt of the Allies’ opening 
onslaught.  Behind them would stand a secondary line of Japanese troops [...] 
concentrated on the perimeter of Java’s massif central [...].  Finally, high up in the 
hills, there would be a group of Japanese and Indonesians specially trained in the 
techniques of sabotage and prolonged guerrilla warfare.  The general expectation 
was that fighting between the enemy and the Peta would fire the whole population 
behind the anti-Allied cause. [...] If and when the Allies finally crushed them, the 
guerillas would remain a running sore on the body of the victorious Dutch or 
Allied administration. (Anderson, Aspects 38)   
How much of this “grand strategy” was imparted to the Indonesian PETA officers is not clear, 
but the three-phased plan, in combination with the locality-based nature of the battalions, 
describes the essence of later TNI territorial defense doctrine.20  With some variations, 
Indonesian defense doctrine has always been predicated on the strategy of an initial conventional 
military defense at the outer limits, transitioning into a territorially based defense-in-depth, and 
ultimately falling back on guerrilla warfare. 
 With the PETA battalions’ local roots and territorial defense function, combined with 
professional military training and organization, PETA units “gradually became the nucleus of the 
people’s resistance organization in their areas” (Nasution, Fundamentals 55).  While some 
writers such as Nugroho Notosusanto downplay any special role of PETA officers in the post-
revolution army, instead citing the “common experience . . . not very different from the 
experiences of millions of other Indonesians at the time who also had some Japanese military 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     20 For an overview of Indonesian defense strategy and capabilities, see Robert Lowry, Indonesian Defence Policy 
and the Indonesian Armed Forces, 1993, p. 36.  
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training” (183), there was no other organization with the complete level of professional training 
and organization that PETA possessed.  It was natural that PETA would become the nucleus of 
revolutionary resistance as well as the core of the later TNI.  Furthermore, the forces’ territorial 
organization was specifically designed so that PETA battalions would coordinate and train the 
local population for “total resistance” (Nasution, National 1, 55). 
 
Summary 
 When on August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito declared Japan’s surrender, the PETA army 
which had been in development for over two years was thrust into a new role in Indonesia’s 
struggle for independence.  The force that the Japanese left behind would be tempered through 
the forge of revolution and play a central role in the creation of the Indonesian military, and 
subsequently the trajectory of the nation.  The following is a distillation of the framework that 
remained upon IJA’s departure. 
 Aside from PETA, the Japanese formed and fostered a number of other nationalist and 
religious paramilitary groups, and provided some of them with rudimentary training and drill.  
These would join with PETA units to form a popular, youth-centric, amalgamated revolutionary 
force.  However, only two groups could truly call themselves soldiers: former members of the 
Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger—KNIL), and ex-
PETA recruits.  Although ex-KNIL officers would play an important role as individuals, as a 
group the ex-PETA units were the leading core of the revolutionary force.  Furthermore, the 
PETA force, although largely drawn from a largely middle-class, comparatively well-educated 
strata, was a caste apart from the culture of Western-educated, civilian elites such as Sukarno and 
Hatta, or the upper class background that would have been necessary to gain access to Dutch 
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officer education prior to Japanese occupation.21  The PETA officer group largely came from 
rural or semi-rural backgrounds, more likely to adhere to “traditional” values, and more likely to 
reject the influx of modernization and Westernization than their elite counterparts. 
 A corollary point is that although PETA officers were trained by professional soldiers, 
they were not trained to be professional soldiers.  Although military professionalism22 is a 
relative term, the fundamental purpose behind Japan’s creation of PETA was to create an 
auxiliary fighting force trained in guerrilla warfare.  Rhetoric and propaganda aside, the primary 
purpose was not to create a modern national army, with an officer corps versed in military art 
and science.   
 With PETA having been formed in this way, it is no surprise that a guerrilla warfare 
mentality became central to the TNI’s identity.  A critic may argue that revolutionary warfare 
was every Indonesian soldier’s heritage.  But that alone does not pre-destine an army to adopt 
guerrilla warfare as the basis of its national military identity.  The regional defense alignment of 
PETA organization became the basis for the territorial command system, which persists to this 
day.  This system is mutually reinforcing with the principles of guerrilla warfare, in which 
cohesion with, and control of the population is vital, and is a reason why the TNI has never “left 
the village.”23   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     21 For a breakdown of PETA officer socio-economic and education backgrounds, see Nugroho Notosusanto, The 
Peta Army during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia, 105-109.  More than half of PETA officers belonged to 
either “little Priyayi,” or commoner backgrounds; and nearly two-thirds had a junior high school education or less.  
The numbers are skewed even more towards the lower level classes when looking only at the young shodancho 
group, which would have the longest longevity and greatest impact in the TNI.  Yet, Notosusanto rejects the 
possibility that the PETA officers as a group had a substantially different outlook than ex-KNIL or other Indonesians 
of more privileged background.  Like much of his writings, this seems to be New Order historical revisionism.   
     22 The debate on “professionalism” in the TNI, as defined by western perspectives on military professionalism, is 
a discussion too long for this venue.  The key point here is that there is an obvious qualitative difference between a 
soldier trained to be guerrilla, and a soldier trained to be a member of a conventional national army.   
     23 A reference to the Indonesian military’s ABRI masuk desa (“Armed Forces enters the village”) program in the 
1980s, in which the military undertook civic works projects and indoctrination in local communities, exerting further 
control in daily domestic life.   
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 Perhaps most importantly, the Japanese seem to have incited the revolutionary 
nationalism of their trainees, “in whom the patterns to be expected of the Japanese military 
personality found an inevitable reflection” (Anderson, Aspects 48).  The PETA, in particular, as 
“an elite corps, gradually came to see itself as the vanguard of revolutionary nationalism . . . and 
developed an increasingly intense esprit de corps” (47).  Perhaps in this process, too, the PETA 
troops absorbed some of the Japanese brand of military nationalism, in which the military had 
not only the right, but also the obligation to play a role in state affairs.  In 1979, former TNI 
chief-of-staff General T.B. Simatupang noted the link between the ex-PETA dominated military 
and the Japanese occupation military’s attitudes: “Since liberation from the control of the 
Japanese military, the national armed forces, whose members were influenced by the education 
and training these provided, show the same dangerous militarist tendencies as the Japanese 
army” (Indonesia Tsushin, 5 December 1979, cited in Goto 543).  
 How much of the underlying IJA culture the PETA officers absorbed, and carried 
forward into the TNI will be explored in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 2 
INSTITUTIONALIZING THE PETA GENERATION 
“There are those who say that a guerrilla war brings more disaster than blessing, arguing that a 
guerrilla war is indeed destructive in nature. The destruction is intensive and extensive, not only 
materially because it uses sabotage and scorched earth, but also what is more, it causes 
psychological, political and social damage. A guerrilla fighter is bred on a spirit of destruction 
and is not easily repatriated into the community as an ordinary citizen. If one is accustomed to 
using harsh and brutal measures, he does not easily change and become a tactful and patient man 
again. If one is used to being active in underground activities, he is not easily moved to pay 
attention to legal rules. Most standards and values common in law-abiding countries and ordered 
societies have tumbled down and many have become old-fashioned. The spirit of revolution, of 
guerrilla warfare and of scorched earth is aimed at destroying the whole existing religious, legal, 
socio-economic order which forms the organization of the dominating power. How can the 
guerrilla accept again a legal, political and socio-economic situation since to him it has the taint 
of the old system? Many nations and countries, in fact, continue to be chaotic years and decades 
after a guerrilla war overturns and rubs out the ethical, legal standards which are normally found 
in a society. Burning, sabotage, killing and kidnapping at the expense of the enemy have a heroic 
value. To have participated in guerrilla activities makes it difficult for one to adapt oneself to an 
ordered society, a society based on law.”24 
 
“The guerilla must be fought with his own tactics. This is the essence of anti-guerilla   
strategy.”25 
 
 —General Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare and the Indonesian 
Defence System Past and Future, 1953 
  
 The period between the end of World War II and the beginning of the New Order saw the 
nascent Indonesian Army engaged in almost constant warfare, both in guerrilla form during the 
independence struggle, as well as in multiple counter-insurgency campaigns against separatist 
movements throughout the archipelago.  Ex-PETA soldiers and officers made up the bulk of the 
army from the beginning (Notosusanto, Struggle 111), and the foundations of their common 
training shaped a common outlook among their generation.  This was not without significant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     24 Nasution, Fundamentals 49-50 
     25 Nasution, Fundamentals 64 
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internal conflict, as ex-PETA officers clashed with their ex-KNIL counterparts as well as with 
civilian nationalist leaders over the identity and future of the armed forces.  These repeated 
experiences of guerrilla warfare and internal conflict would set patterns and ingrain norms in the 
TNI that would persist for decades.    
  
Formation of the Indonesian Armed Forces 
 The Japanese Emperor’s August 15, 1945 declaration of defeat threw PETA into chaos.  
The Allies’ insistence that the Indonesians be disarmed and demobilized placed the Japanese in a 
difficult situation.  They neither wanted to arm the population and create a potentially more 
explosive situation upon the Allies’ arrival, opening themselves to accusations of not fulfilling 
their obligations under terms of peace; nor did they want to risk confronting the already inflamed 
Indonesian population by appearing to prepare them for re-subjugation.  Further, many of the 
Japanese PETA advisors had developed close ties with their Indonesian counterparts, and were 
sympathetic to their desire for independence (Oba 2; Miyamoto 220).   
 The lack of a central, unified Indonesian command for the PETA resulted in each 
territorial PETA battalion undertaking “demobilization” on its own terms.  This ranged from 
violent raiding of weapons and supply depots, to “the peaceable transfer of large quantities of 
military equipment to the local PETA Battalion Commander,” as happened in Banjumas with 
General Sudirman, the future first Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Anderson, 
Aspects 118).26  While eventually most of the PETA units joined and formed the core of the first 
Indonesian national military, power remained strongly territorialized under each locality’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     26 According to Reid and Oki (footnote 338), this easy acquisition of such a large cache of arms made Sudirman’s 
Banyumas Battalion the best equipped in the whole Army at the time.  This may have helped jump start his success 
as a revolutionary commander, making him “first among equals” of basically 67 separate militia units on Java at the 
time.  In addition to his legendary charisma, the influence of early local units in the army was in direct correlation to 
the number of arms in their possession. 
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leading bapak.  Having already been set in place under the Japanese PETA daidan system, and 
having natural cultural roots in Javanese society, the mass of pemuda tended to collect around 
local “respected elders.”  This had long-term consequences, setting up a recurring theme in the 
Indonesian military regarding the balance of power between the center and the territories.  
Particularly in the early days of the nation, the bapak were in a strong position relative to the 
national authority and could not be “ordered” or removed (Nasution, National 154-155; 
Anderson, Java 236).   
 The first manifestation of the Indonesian military was the Badan Keamanan Rakyat 
(BKR; People’s Security Body), formed by the PPKI (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia; Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) under Sukarno on August 29, 
1945, as an interim hybrid between a national army and a security police force, largely as a 
vehicle to absorb the various independent militia units.  The BKR was quickly superseded in 
October by the Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR; People’s Security Army) in an attempt to 
impose greater hierarchical organization and control.  Both early forms of the army were led by 
Major Urip Sumohardjo, a retired career KNIL officer who had achieved the highest position by 
an Indonesian within the Dutch colonial army (Anderson, Java 232).  While the bulk of the new 
national army’s tactical leadership cadre was made up of former PETA officers, Urip naturally 
relied on ex-KNIL officers, the only ones with any experience in a professionally structured 
military, to “form an effective central organizational structure around which the national army 
could grow” (233-4).  The core of this national military leadership were young former KNIL 
officers known as the “Bandung Group,” among whom were Nasution and Simatupang.  “The 
most significant characteristic of the core of the Bandung group was that . . . they were 
intellectuals who became army officers largely by accident . . . Almost all of them came from the 
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Sundanese upper class or from well-to-do families in the Outer Islands.  With these family 
connections and good Dutch educations, as well as the experience of studying in the relatively 
cosmopolitan atmosphere of Bandung, they had far better access to and sympathy with the 
Djakarta intelligentsia than either the older KNIL officers or, as we shall see, the bulk of the 
Peta” (234-5).   
 The clash of worldviews was evident in conflict between the mostly ex-KNIL regional 
commanders (divided into West, East, and Central Java regions, for example), and the mostly ex-
PETA division and battalion commanders under them.  The KNIL veterans, with “their expertise 
in staff organization and military theory, and their conventional professional training,” were far 
out of touch with the mass of pemuda perjuangan (“youth of the struggle”), who tended to 
gravitate to the PETA officers, with their indoctrination in the revolutionary ideology of the 
guerrilla army of the people (238-39).  One of the early milestones in this conflict was the 
selection of the first panglima besar (Commander-in-Chief)27 at a conference in November 1945.  
Urip was the KNIL faction’s candidate, and Sudirman was the favorite of the PETA officers.  
Sudirman won, though narrowly, in no small part due to his legendary charisma and leadership, 
but also his exceptional battlefield reputation.  These qualities soon enabled him to overcome 
many of the internal frictions within the army and gain loyalty from members of both sides.  His 
selection, however, entrenched a different conflict and precedent: 
The strength of Sudirman’s new position . . . also derived from the way in which 
his office was regarded by the dominant Peta component of the army. The Peta 
had been nurtured in the Japanese tradition, and by that tradition, at least in the 
latter days of the Empire, the effective head of the army, the chief of staff, was 
chosen by consultations among the senior officers from which civilians were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     27 For an interesting discussion of the title panglima besar and its history, see footnote 22 in Anderson, Java 244.   
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rigidly excluded.  Moreover, the chief of staff was not subordinated to the 
Japanese cabinet but reported directly to the Emperor.  From the start Sudirman 
made every effort to live up to this tradition. He regarded himself as coequal to 
the cabinet leaders, not subordinate to them, and in this interpretation of his role 
received strong support from within the army. (246) 
 If the conflict between the KNIL and PETA officers was more than simply a clash of 
class upbringings and experiences, but fundamentally a fight over what kind of army Indonesia 
should have, the parallel but related struggle that raged between the army and civilian leadership 
was over what the military’s role should be within the larger structure of the future Indonesian 
government and society (248).  Civilian leaders such as Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin were particularly 
“anxious to assert civilian control over the armed forces, in whose independence they spied the 
seeds of fascism” (McVey, “Part I” 136).   
 It would be overly simplistic to characterize the KNIL faction as being aligned with the 
civilian national leadership, as there were numerous shifts in alliances throughout the period.  
The KNIL faction was primarily interested in developing a modern national military.  Civilian 
leaders were mostly concerned with gaining control over the military, a goal that often aligned 
with the modernist KNIL faction’s efforts to rationalize the structure of the military.   
  
Generasi ’45 
 The defining trait of the PETA officers in the post-war era was their continuing sense of 
revolutionary nationalism, a sentiment shared deeply and broadly across their cohort as to define 
them as the Generasi ’45.  Having risen through shared experiences and training, and having 
fought together as the military core of the national struggle for independence, this generation was 
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united by an outlook that they alone had earned their namesake, “Defenders of the Homeland.”  
Most saw themselves not as “professional” soldiers in the Western military sense, but more as 
nationalist freedom fighters dedicated to upholding the ideals of the Revolution.  The corollary to 
this worldview was a general suspicion of the civilians in the government, as well as distrust in 
the ideological strength of the succeeding generation that had not shared in its trials, and whom 
they would keep from the highest positions of power for nearly 40 years.28  Their ideology of 
perjuangan, or struggle in unity with the populace, infuses official military rhetoric even today.  
The shared beliefs of this cohort were magnified by their overwhelming numbers among the TNI 
officer corps, which, as late as 1971, still made up three-fourths of the upper leadership echelons 
in the army (Nugroho, as cited in Lebra, “Significance” 225).29   
 The revolutionary instincts of Generasi ’45 came into conflict, however, with the realities 
of nation building and a new national army’s needs for modern organization, equipment, and 
doctrine.  This “rationalizing” of the military was championed by former-KNIL officers led by 
Generals A.H. Nasution and T.B. Simatupang, who together monopolized the position of Chief 
of Staff of the Armed Forces from 1950-1966 (Haseman, “Security” 292).  Under Nasution, the 
“operational units in all three services were reorganized in accordance with organizational tables 
borrowed from Western armed forces” (292).  Their efforts to streamline and increase the 
efficiency of the military establishment were a continuation of initial efforts by Prime Minister 
Mohammed Hatta, who was also from a similar Dutch-educated, privileged background (D. 
Anderson 1-2).  Many of the PETA officers, however, strongly resisted the changes, as the 
Western-oriented “professionalism” seemed at odds with the decentralized, “revolutionary spirit” 
of their guerrilla warfare outlook, as well as seeming to provide an advantage to the ex-KNIL 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     28 The first non-PETA trained officer to become Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (after Simatupang 
and Nasution) was Mohammed Jusuf in 1978, followed by Benny Moerdani in 1983.  
     29 Lebra cites Nugroho Notosusanto, “The Peta Army in Indonesia,” mimeo., Djakarta, I97I, p. I2. 
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officers in the post-war government (Haseman, “Security” 292).  This modernizing process also 
implied a separation of the military from its political role, an idea that was highly unpopular in a 
post-revolution military that considered participation in governance a right that it had earned.   
 The ideological conflict between the ex-PETA faction and the ex-KNIL can also be 
explained in part by differences in class.  Former KNIL soldiers such as Nasution, who had 
attended the Royal Netherlands Military Academy before the Japanese invasion, generally came 
from a privileged background that enabled them to acquire an advanced Western education 
(McVey, “Part I” 133-34).  The PETA trained officers, by contrast, represented a much broader 
swath of Indonesian society.  While most of the officers did have a decent educational 
background when compared to the majority of their countrymen and had undergone some 
schooling,30 they did not come from the “highly advantaged group of the university-educated 
which served in the top nationalist leadership” (133-34).  Moreover, the foundational training 
received in the PETA and the subsequent revolutionary experience fostered a “profoundly anti-
hierarchical impulse” at odds with the “image of rationalism, order, and expertise employed by 
the Dutch” (139).  These men, for whom the revolution was their military education, and who 
had fought relying on the support of the rural population and valued semangat over science, 
hewing too close to a Western mold amounted to a re-entrenchment of colonialism and a betrayal 
of the spirit of the struggle (D. Anderson 2).   
 A critical area in which the difference between the ex-KNIL modernizers and the more 
reactionary PETA-trained officers surfaced is in the realm of military education, which was seen 
as a tool for ideological control of the military and inculcating the next generation’s values 
(McVey, “Part II” 162-63).  The centralization and modernization of the Indonesian military’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     30 According to the 1930 census, the literacy rate was 6.4 percent.  A. Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution, 
1974. p. 2.   
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education system can almost entirely be attributed to General Ahmad Yani, who in 1956 was one 
of the early Indonesian officers to attend the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 
(CGSC) in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (Evans 38).31  Prior to Yani’s campaign to reform the 
TNI’s education system, military training was somewhat widely dispersed throughout the various 
military districts, frequently in the same facilities previously used for PETA training.  For 
example, military academies were run in both Tanggerang (at the initial Beppan complex) and 
Jogjakarta, and cadet schools operated in multiple locations throughout Java and Sumatra at old 
PETA training sites.  With few exceptions, they were run almost entirely by ex-PETA instructors 
who modeled the curriculum on their shodancho training (Sejarah II, 69-80).  In Tanggerang, for 
example, the first director of the military academy was Mayor Daan Magot, who had been one of 
the first Indonesian officers trained there by the Beppan cadre, and was followed by Kemal Idris, 
who was also a graduate of the same class (70).  Their staff of instructors consisted mostly (80 
percent) of ex-PETA officers.  The PETA influence on instruction was so total that, at the East 
Java Officer School (Sekolah Kader Perwira Divisi III) in Mojoagung, newly graduating second 
lieutenants were presented with samurai swords (71).   
 Upon Yani’s return to Indonesia from Fort Leavenworth, he began to direct the reform of 
the military education system as the head of operations section for the General Staff (SUAD II), 
and later as the Army Chief of Staff (Evans 38).  Several significant changes had occurred in the 
period between 1950-57 (particularly following the 1949 Hague Round Table Conference), with 
the establishment of several new military schools and increased access to foreign military 
training (Sejarah II, 41-64).  However it was Yani, freshly returned from CGSC in 1957, who 
truly implemented the modernization of education by greatly increasing the number of TNI 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     31 Yani, although he joined PETA, previously had served in the KNIL.  Furthermore, his father worked for a 
Dutch general and Yani was afforded significant educational opportunities, aligning him more with the modernizer 
camp.    
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officers being sent to U.S. military schooling, and requiring them to serve at the corresponding 
TNI school as instructors for a year upon their return (Evans 38).  Yani’s impact is most clear in 
his restructuring of the two most important schools in the Indonesian military—the Military 
Academy, and the Indonesian Army Command and Staff School—which he largely revamped to 
duplicate their American counterparts (39-40).32  In doing so, Yani centralized the education 
system and removed any authority for doctrine from the regional military training centers, which 
to this point had largely been responsible for producing their own curriculum.  This effectively 
completed the erasure of formal PETA training from the Indonesian military system.  Between 
1954-65, over 2,800 Indonesian officers were trained in the U.S., including 53 officers who 
attended the U.S. CGSC (Evans 40, 44).33   
 According to McVey, the goal was nothing short of the ideological transformation and 
standardization of the TNI officer corps:  
The immediate ideological goal sought was, with gestures to the Indonesian 
revolutionary heritage, the Western ideal of the professional soldier: a nationalism 
deemed to be above partisan politics, a stress on hierarchy and discipline, and a 
sense of pride at being part of a vital and highly trained organization.  By 
intensive indoctrination and the development of military skills, it was hoped, 
army men would adopt a more “modern” and professional way of looking at their 
role and would cease to be distracted by the anti-hierarchical ideals of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     32 McVey states that the structure of the Akademi Militer was to be based on the Royal Netherlands Military 
Academy, and other influences for the higher-level courses included the British-based Indian and Pakistani staff 
colleges (Kedaulatan Rakjat, April 26, 1958, statement by General Nasution; cited in McVey, “Part II” 170).  
However, it seems to me that the doctrinal instruction that was adopted (aside from territorial doctrine) was mostly 
based on the U.S. Army doctrine, especially after 1967.   
     33 The prestige and importance accorded to the U.S. CGSC during that period was probably equal to the role 
SESKOAD came to play in the TNI, and certainly the role that it plays today.   
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revolution, by patron-client ties, and by regional and religious loyalties. (“Part I” 
167) 
This transformation was not without growing pains, however, and was never adopted wholesale 
by the largely ex-PETA officer corps, who by this time would have occupied most of the middle-
to-upper echelon of leadership in the military.  Given their revolutionary background, “the 
army’s leaders found it hard to reconcile Western ideas of professionalism with a larger social 
role . . . and above all they possessed no sure vision of Indonesia’s goals themselves. They 
continued to think of themselves and the army as revolutionary in spite of the military’s 
increasingly conservative social role” (McVey, “Part II” 171).  The ideological conflict and 
confusion within the military can be seen in Nasution’s own formulation of the sufficiently 
vague “middle way,” which advocated “neither accepting direct leadership of and responsibility 
for the country’s course nor yet abandoning its claims to participate in political and economic 
life” (171).  Yet, this understanding describes what the army should not be (neither dominated by 
civilians nor dominating politics), but not what the army should be, and it “did not provide the 
clarity of purpose essential to give meaning to the army’s broader role” (171).   
 Despite the internal resistance to Westernizing the military, the large number of 
Indonesians officers trained in foreign schools, in addition to Yani's fait accompli of 
modernizing the TNI education system, begs the question of why these changes did not have a 
greater impact on the TNI.   
 One explanation for the considerable unease in adopting Western doctrines of warfare 
was that they seemed completely at odds with the very different experience of combat the former 
Indonesian guerrillas had fought.  The concepts of large-scale maneuver warfare seemed ill 
suited for both the social and political conditions of the post-independence nation, the new 
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military’s actual capabilities, and the strong institutional self-conception of the military as 
freedom fighters and defenders of the nation, not as an army for expeditionary combat.  
 A more important reason for the stagnation of new ideas has to do with the PETA 
generation itself, which would not have received the bulk of the foreign training, except for a few 
cases like Yani.  They were too senior when the flood of opportunities became open in the late 
1950s (Yani having been largely the one who opened the gates), and most did not have the 
linguistic or educational background to take advantage of it.  As previously discussed, while the 
PETA officers were generally better educated than the average population in 1945, most were 
from modest backgrounds and largely from rural areas.   
 The Generasi ’45 officers also had entered into the service in war while they were in their 
teens and twenties, and were “roughly the same age from private to chief of staff" (McVey, “Part 
I” 154).  While the TNI later passed a mandatory retirement age of 55, this made for an 
exceptionally long career, and entrenched these ex-PETA officers in power for decades, well into 
the late 1970s and early 1980s.  With all of the major leadership posts held by the Generation of 
1945, there were few chances for promotion to general.  Hundreds of less senior Generasi ’45 
officers choked the lieutenant colonel and colonel ranks. The Generation of 1945 was reluctant 
to pass along power and access to promotion because of a natural desire to retain power as well 
as a very real feeling that the New Generation officers were not ready to receive power 
(Haseman, “Dynamics” 888).  With few prospects or expectations for an equally lucrative career 
outside of the military, most officers chose to remain in the service until forced to leave.  This 
resulted in a stagnation of new blood and new ideas flowing up into positions able to affect 
change.  For example, the first non-PETA trained officer to become Commander of the 
Indonesian Armed Forces (aside from Simatupang and Nasution) was Mohammed Jusuf in 1978, 
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followed by Benny Murdani in 1983.  Perhaps more tellingly, the first Indonesian Military 
Academy (AKMIL) graduate to become Panglima ABRI, in 1993, was Edi Sudradjat, who had 
graduated from the first official AKMIL class in 1960.  In other words, it was not until 1993 that 
an officer who had received a foundation of professional, modern military education not based 
on PETA training, became leader of the Indonesian Armed Forces.  These men demonstrated a 
significantly different outlook from the PETA generation when they finally reached the pinnacles 
of military power and no longer had to be concerned about being sidelined for promotion.  Even 
Benny Murdani, who had attended the U.S. Army Infantry Officer Advanced Course at Fort 
Benning, Georgia as a young officer in the early 1960s, demonstrated a worldview very different 
from his PETA predecessors.  While Murdani was very much a product of the TNI's institutional 
culture, he was a proponent of modernization.  Upon taking command of the military, he 
immediately implemented a wide-ranging modernization program (Sejarah V, 1-23).   
 
The Development of Guerrilla and Anti-Guerrilla Warfare Doctrine 
 The Indonesian army’s developing doctrine was captured and codified in Nasution’s The 
Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare (Pokok-Pokok Gerilya), first published in 1953.  The book 
encapsulates what would become the basis of the Indonesian defense system, especially its 
concept of “total people’s defense” (pertahanan rakyat semesta).  Like other writers on guerrilla 
warfare, Nasution stresses the symbiotic relationship between the guerrilla and the people, the 
importance of ideology, and the fundamentally asymmetric nature of such warfare.  In an echo of 
the PETA indoctrination’s influence throughout the TNI, he repeatedly stresses the importance 
of “a strong inner spirit” and the “fighting spirit which is burning in the heart of the guerrilla” as 
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essential and enabling elements of victory that could overcome a materially superior but 
ideologically inferior foe.   
 Nasution demonstrates familiarity with some of the existing theories and guerrilla wars 
contemporary to his time, quoting Mao Tse-tung and T.E. Lawrence.  However, he adapts 
general guerrilla warfare principles to Indonesia’s unique strategic situation, and lays out a 
doctrine that is specific to the country’s moment in history.  Elucidated by actual command 
directives that were sent to TKR units in the field from 1948-1949, the book represents a kind of 
historical record of how the Indonesian army actually fought.   
 The key concept of “total people’s defense” involved the complete integration of military 
and civilian components into a unified resistance, in which “the military was the senior partner 
on the team” (Notosusanto, Struggle 126).  In Nasution’s construction, a military government 
would exist in parallel with the existing civilian structure extending down to the village level, 
forming a military territorial command system.  One of the key tasks of the military district 
commands was the recruitment and training of local village auxiliary units that he designates as 
Pasukan Gerilya Desa (or Pager Desa in condensed form; Nasution, Fundamentals 170-172).  
The formation of local militia units was a natural outgrowth of the PETA experience in which, 
aside from having been trained as a militia themselves, PETA-trained cadre were expected to 
recruit and train battalions from the local population in their home areas.  During the war for 
independence, there would have been a rather narrow distinction between pager desa volunteers 
and “official” guerrilla fighters in the TKR.  However, the formation of local militia groups 
would become a mainstay of Indonesian military operations.  It is a practice that appears in every 
named conflict in the TNI’s history, and, during the New Order, became a tool of internal 
security.   
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 A unique aspect of Nasution’s Fundamentals is the second section, in which he offers an 
accurate assessment of Indonesia’s strategic security situation in 1953, and pragmatically lays 
out the kind of army needed for the foreseeable future.  Of note, Nasution identifies Indonesia as 
a vulnerable, fledgling state, and stresses the necessity of maintaining guerrilla warfare as the 
central element of Indonesian defense strategy for the coming decades.  This strategy called for a 
light infantry-focused force structure, organized territorially.  Nasution also correctly identifies 
anti-guerrilla operations as the primary mission for Indonesia’s army in the post-independence 
period.  For Nasution, such operations are simply a logical extension of guerrilla warfare: “The 
guerrilla fighter must be separated from the people.  The guerrilla must be fought with his own 
tactics.  This is the essence of anti-guerrilla strategy” (64).   
 It is in describing these tactics, however, that we see the seeds of the TNI’s institutional 
culture.  While recognizing many of the typical counterinsurgency tenets found in other works, 
such as knowledge of the people and land, tactful treatment of both civilians and enemy, the all-
encompassing political and social nature of such wars, Nasution is extremely frank in describing 
the kind of violence that guerrilla warfare entails.  He states that the guerrilla force must be 
prepared for fact that the occupying force will undertake “Collective punishment, extensive 
torturing, even the elimination of whole kampongs and the machine-gunning of the people on a 
mass basis” (35).  In retribution, the guerrilla army must be prepared “to launch even harsher 
measures against the enemy” (35).    
  The extreme nature of violence in guerrilla warfare is a theme repeated throughout the 
book, and if it can be taken as a reflection of actual experience, Nasution’s description of warfare 
reveals something of what was imprinted on the TNI’s collective psyche during these years.  
While never directly advocating behavior such as torture, illegal killing, or the targeting of 
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civilians, Nasution matter-of-factly discusses such brutal excesses as a given condition in 
guerrilla warfare: 
Experiences in guerilla war have shown that retaliatory measures from both sides 
become increasingly cruel. The spirit of revenge drowns out sound reasoning and 
the sense of fair play. The anti-guerilla units retaliate against the people 
collectively because they aid or hide the guerilla fighters.  The anti-guerilla units 
torture the members and relatives of guerilla troops to make them fearful; 
sometimes whole villages are burned to the ground.  The guerilla fighters take 
revenge by being even more inhuman; every collaborator and every enemy soldier 
who falls in their hands is tortured just as mercilessly.  Be that as it may, it must 
be remembered that guerilla activities are not the final aim; they are merely an 
effort to defend an ideology, to defend freedom, the principles of human rights 
and the holy rights of a nation, which determine the future of generations to come. 
(50) 
Nasution, then, seems to regard this kind of violence not with condemnation, but rather in an 
instrumental way, as an unfortunate but necessary means to freedom: “A nation is fortunate if it 
has sufficient military power . . . to fight a regular war.  However, if that is not possible . . . the 
nation must resort to guerrilla warfare . . . with all of the necessary consequences” (50).  In this 
kind of war, “Burning, sabotage, killing and kidnapping at the expense of the enemy have a 
heroic value” (50).  In fact, Nasution lists “execute scorched earth policy” among the specified 
duties of guerrilla units in military sub-district commands (170).  Although he never defines 
exactly what he means by “scorched earth,” we may infer that it entails the absolute destruction 
of the enemy by every means possible.   
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 Although Nasution was an ex-KNIL officer and had not been a member of PETA, his 
writings about guerrilla warfare reflect the general experience and outlook of the Indonesian 
revolutionary army, which was led at the tactical level mostly by ex-PETA officers.  Nugroho 
Notosusanto also notes that Nasution was not the only one with such ideas, but the one best 
equipped to codify and express them (Struggle 116).  And while it may stretch the imagination to 
say that the lessons in the book were directly imparted by the Japanese, they would certainly 
have resonated with ex-PETA soldiers in the TNI, and likely with their former Japanese mentors 
as well, whose own brutal experiences in counter-guerrilla warfare in northern China Nasution 
references.   
 The two decades following the formation of the Indonesian military offered a continuous 
opportunity to put these ideas into practice against a variety of rebellions and separatist 
movements.  From the 1948 Communist uprising in Madiun, the Permesta rebellion in Sulawesi 
(1958-1961), and the Darul Islam movement (1949-1962) among others, the TNI gained 
considerable experience in anti-guerrilla warfare which ingrained certain lessons that became 
essential elements of TNI organizational culture.  While there is a dearth of historical 
information on the TNI’s early counterinsurgency operations, particularly regarding the kinds of 
violence employed, a central theme that emerges is the conflicting impulses within the post-
revolution army, which had been conditioned to the unbridled and total violence of warfare as 
guerrillas but were now acting as an anti-guerrilla force.  This tension is inherent in Nasution’s 
own work, where, alongside and in contrast to the “scorched earth” truths previously noted, he 
insists on the necessity of restraint in anti-guerrilla operations: 
To ensure the right attitude and good behaviour of an occupation army and an 
anti-guerilla army is a primary condition for conquering the guerillas.  Desires 
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must be bridled, the spirit of revenge must be controlled and cruelty must be 
avoided.  Collective arrests, collective punishment, and the burning of civilian 
houses because these civilians assisted or hid guerilla fighters become the most 
potent weapons to serve the guerilla cause since it makes them appear even more 
as the people’s protectors or avengers against tyranny and injustice.  On the other 
hand, the anti-guerilla members must work for true justice and virtue.  They must 
practice justice in action, maintaining principles of humanity, and everything that 
creates and increases the feeling of appreciation and respect of the people. 
(Fundamentals 56)  
 
Nasution also states the paramount importance of political, social, and economic factors in an 
overall plan.  Yet, he acknowledges the TNI’s own behavior was focused mainly on offensive 
actions: 
But the strange thing was that after 1950 we assumed, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, the mistakes of the former Dutch army . . . We did not draft one 
systematic plan of operation in all fields, but we limited ourselves to military 
operations only. In many ways we did not pay enough attention to the factor of 
the people.  Many of our measures resulted in increasing our enemies (66).   
 
 Despite its struggle in adapting to this role reversal, the TNI was successful in 
suppressing these rebellions through military force.  A key component of that success was its use 
of local militias, which became a standard practice.  Based in PETA training and building on its 
application during the independence struggle, mobilization of civilian forces to augment the 
military became a part of the TNI’s doctrine.  However, one particularly successful variation of 
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militia mobilization, first used in the campaign against the Darul Islam, was called pagar betis, 
or “fence of legs.”  The tactic involved conscripting civilians from villages around an enemy 
guerrilla base, and forming them into an encircling and tightening cordon to trap the guerrillas.  
The guerrillas “either had to stay and be captured, or break out, potentially killing local 
villagers” (Kilcullen 50).  The use of pagar betis aided in the capture of the key Darul Islam 
leaders, leading to the collapse of the movement.  The success of the approach cemented its use 
as a key TNI tactic, and was used again later in much more devastating form in the 1965-66 
killings, and again in East Timor (Robinson, “People’s War” 291).   
  
The New Order 
 The advent of the New Order, in a sense, was both a culmination and resolution to many 
of the conflicting themes that marked the post-independence period.  The problems of political 
strife in the government, the proper role of the military in the nation, and the conflicted 
relationship between the military and civilians were swept aside by the October 1, 1965 coup and 
the subsequent national massacres, in which an estimated 500,000 to as many as three million 
Indonesians were killed.34  Additionally, in “direct connection with the coup, approximately 
15,000 soldiers ranking from privates to generals were arrested” or killed during the 1965-67 
period (Utrecht 163).   
 The terrible violence of the 1965-66 killings, while having multiple and complex 
underlying causes,35 can be seen as the climax of the pattern of “scorched earth” practices 
combined with the mobilization of civilian militias.  While the extent of the army’s involvement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     34 For discussion of the various estimates, see Robert Cribb, “Unresolved Problems of the 1965-66 Killings,” 
p.557-59.   
     35 For example, see Geoffrey Robinson, Dark Side of Paradise, and Robert Cribb, “Unresolved Problems of the 
1965-66 Killings.” 
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is a matter of some debate, the critical role of the military in inciting and enabling the killings is 
well established (Cribb, “Unresolved Problems” 551-53; Crouch 148-55).  For example, the 
TNI’s Para-commando Regiment (RPKAD)36, led by Sarwo Edhie Wibowo (a PETA classmate 
of Yani), attacked suspected Communist villages throughout Central and East Java, often 
organizing and equipping local militias to carry out the killings (Thaler 207; Crouch 149-51).  
RPKAD, which had also played a key role in the Darul Islam campaign, would play a similar 
leading role in the East Timor campaign in the form of its successor unit, Kopassandha.   
 Thaler writes, “This pattern manifested itself across all the regions of the slaughter: 
civilians, usually part of larger organizations, carried out the majority of the killings, but they 
had support, weapons, and training from the military, which still directly participated in many of 
the killings” (Thaler 208).  The nature of the violence harkened back to the chaos of the 
revolutionary period, and involved the “common methods” of “beating, throat cutting, and 
decapitation,” in addition to torture, rape, and sexual mutilation (208-9).  Many of these were 
“adaptations of methods learned under Japanese rule” (Robinson, “People’s War” 291).  The 
bloody years of revolution had ingrained a mode of violence that repeated and reinforced itself, 
and these “habits and norms of extreme brutality that spread and became institutionalized . . . 
shaped military and militia behavior” (314).   
 The New Order also permanently entrenched the PETA generation’s ideas of the 
military’s role in the Indonesian nation as both a revolutionary guerrilla force and a social-
political force, involving the military in every facet of the country’s political, economic, and 
social life.  In 1962, the guerrilla warfare doctrine of territorial defense was formalized as the 
TNI’s official doctrine, recreating “the territorial apparatus of the military running parallel to the 
government apparatus as had existed during the guerilla war from 1948 to 1949” (Singh, Dual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     36 The RPKAD is the predecessor to the Special Forces (Kopassandha, later called Kopassus).   
	   54 
79-81).  This was followed in 1966 by the promulgation of a new doctrine called Tri Ubaya 
Sakti37, which established the basis for the military’s “comprehensive involvement in non-
military activities,” (87-90).  It was accompanied by a strategic doctrine of “Total People’s 
Defense System” (Sishankamrata—Sistem Pertahanan dan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta), which 
adopted Nasution’s view that the nation could not defend itself against an invading force by 
conventional means, and would have to rely on guerrilla warfare, in which the populace would 
play a significant role.  The combination of these three doctrines formed the rationale for the 
New Order military’s pervasive and total presence in Indonesian society.  In practice, since the 
true threats to the government were internal, these served as a basis for the reach of the New 
Order’s apparatus of control and violence down to the village level.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     37 Originally called Tri Ubaya Cakti in its original formulation in the First Army Seminar of April 1965. It was 
renamed Tri Ubaya Sakti in the Second Army Seminar of August 1966 to reflect the removal of "Sukarnoisms" from 
the doctrine.  The translation of the term, meaning "three sacred efforts," is the same in either spelling.  MacFarling 
1996, 89. 
	   55 
CHAPTER 3 
THE TNI’S INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 
 
 By 1975, the year that Indonesia invaded East Timor and began its notorious counter-
insurgency campaign, the TNI looked outwardly like a modern military.  Under Suharto, the 
TNI’s organization had been increasingly centralized and modernized, its personnel and 
promotion system had been rationalized, and its official tactical battle doctrines38 were largely 
derived from the U.S. and Australia along with much of its equipment.39   The number of ex-
PETA officers and soldiers in the services was limited to a handful, mostly at the upper echelons 
and largely removed from operational command and the daily duties of the military.  Most of the 
officers from the PETA generation had retired or were nearing retirement, and there was a 
growing disconnect between the PETA generation and its more professional, educated successor 
generation.   
 But despite these outward transformations, the underlying culture of the TNI remained 
largely the same.  Typically, only failures in wars or extreme changes in technology cause 
militaries to change their institutional cultures, in spite of apparent developments in doctrine.40  
As one military scholar notes, “If the way an army fights is a function of its ‘mindset’ more than 
the contents of its formal doctrine manuals, then so too does that mindset change not simply in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     38 I mean here the maneuver-level unit tactics of actual fighting, not the national strategic doctrine.   
     39 Need citations for: actual tactical doctrine from ca. 1965-75; U.S. weapons sales to Indonesia compared to 
other sources.   
     40 See also Kilcullen, “Globalization and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Doctrine”: “Indeed, 
it may be that operational success raises barriers to future adaptation: most successful reorganisations of military 
forces and their tactics have been responses to failure and defeat, not success. For example, Prussian reforms after 
defeat by Napoleon, US reorganisation and professionalisation after Vietnam, German tactical innovation on the 
Western Front in 1918 and Soviet resurgence after 1941 all seem to indicate that militaries evolve through response 
to the shock of defeat” (60). 
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response to what is written into the doctrine manuals, but in response to vivid experience . . . 
What experiences form an army’s real culture? Unfortunately for those who would try to reform 
an army between wars, the historical record suggests that it is wartime experience rather than 
peacetime innovation that changes an army’s corporate culture” (Johnston 35-36).   
 In the case of Indonesia, every experience of combat preceding the invasion of East 
Timor had been a successful suppression of an internal and regionalized conflict—the only 
exceptions being the limited, low-intensity Konfrontasi campaign, and operations in Papua 
against the Dutch.  In every case, these served to reinforce the existing attitudes and culture 
within the TNI, and re-inculcate them in the new generation.  The 1965-66 killings, which 
occurred only nine years before East Timor, can be seen as the culminating pre-Timor expression 
of the TNI’s use of force.  The guerrilla warfare mindset of the military originating from PETA 
was repeatedly applied against Indonesians.  Simultaneously, the military was adopting U.S. 
military doctrine and equipment in ever-greater numbers.41  But the recurring collective 
experiences of the TNI in its counter-insurgency operations shaped the military’s culture far 
more than the influx of American guns and manuals ever could.  Thus, despite the aging 
demographic of the PETA generation, the swelling of post-PETA generation officers in the 
ranks, and an evolving force structure, the institutional culture of Generasi ’45 was still the 
dominant force in the military.  Writing in 1975, Nugroho Notosusanto stated that, “at the 
present time, the generation of 1945 are still very much in control, especially in the Army” 
(Struggle 135).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     41 Ken Conboy relates Benny Murdani’s account of meeting with National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft 
during Nixon and Kissinger’s visit prior to the invasion of East Timor.  In response to Scowcroft’s question “Will 
you be using U.S. weapons?” Murdani replied, “Our military is largely built around U.S. weapons,” and “We have 
no choice” (242). 
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Guerilla Warfare and the TNI’s “Psyche”42 
 The core of the TNI’s organizational culture derives from its guerrilla warfare mentality, 
and the corollary self-perception of the TNI soldier as first and foremost a revolutionary.  As 
Nugroho Notosusanto states, “it is the deliberate policy of the Armed Forces leadership up till 
the present time, not to become a professional armed forces in the western sense of the term. The 
professed ideal is that of a ‘people’s army, national army and freedom-fighters’ army’” (Struggle 
85).   
 The most visible outward manifestation of the guerrilla warfare mentality is the territorial 
command structure descended from the PETA battalions.  The Japanese restricted contact 
between PETA units in order to prevent them from developing any kind of unity, and also 
encouraged and laid the framework for the territorialism of the battalions.  Despite the fact that 
the command structure of the military was greatly centralized under Suharto, autonomy has 
always been built into the nature of the territorial system.  While regional commanders could no 
longer refuse orders from the center, as had happened to varying degrees up until the New Order, 
a KODAM (Komando Daerah Militer; a regional military command) commander still had 
considerable independence.  Also, the culture of bapak-ism remained a strong theme in informal 
military relationships, and the “warlord-ism” of the early territorial commands later enabled 
institutional activities such as military businesses. 
 The character of the territorial command system may seem like a historical inevitability, 
given Indonesia’s archipelagic nature and defensive-oriented doctrine.  However, if we look at 
the attitudes of the few fully KNIL-trained officers in the early TNI, we can see how differently 
the TNI might have turned out if they had been the dominant force.  The ex-KNIL officers’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     42 The phrasing borrows from the title of McElhatton's article, “Guerrilla Warfare and the Indonesian Strategic 
Psyche.” 
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outlook had been shaped by the bureaucratic rationale of the colonial army, where rank was more 
important than ability, discipline more important than courage, and efficiency more important 
than charisma.  In contrast to the PETA officers, who were “explicitly organized on a regional 
basis,” the KNIL officers had already been part of a national institution that transcended local 
identity (Anderson, Java 237).  Almost none commanded any particular loyalty from men in 
their hometowns, and few KNIL-trained officers were able to successfully command a territorial 
unit during the revolution (235, 237, 240-41).  It is not hard to imagine that if Urip and the cohort 
of ex-KNIL officers had been able to shape the TNI to a greater extent, it would have looked 
much more like a centralized, modern Western army.   
 The TNI’s self-conception is enshrined in its code of conduct, known as the Sapta 
Marga, or seven oaths:  
1. We are citizens of the unitary Republic of Indonesia based on the Pancasila.  
2. We are Indonesian patriots, bearers and defenders of the state ideology, who are 
responsible and know of no surrender.  
3. We are Indonesian knights, who are devoted to the One God, and who defend 
honesty, truth and justice.  
4. We are soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces, guardians of the Indonesian 
state and nation.  
5. We, soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces uphold discipline, are obedient 
and observant to our leadership, and uphold the soldiers’ attitude and oath.  
6. We, soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces set ourselves to perform our task 
with courage, and are always ready to devote ourselves to the state and nation.  
7. We, soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces are loyal and keep our word and 
the Soldiers’ Oath.  
 
 Note that before defining the TNI member as a soldier, he is first defined as a patriot and 
a “knight” (ksatria), a term rich with cultural connotations.  The ksatria tradition and its 
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implications for the PETA generation soldiers has been taken up more fully elsewhere,43 but in 
short, it refers to the traditional Javanese societal divisions along the Hindu class lines of 
Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Sudras, and Vaishyas.  The Kshatriya caste was the class of warriors and 
politicians who were responsible for administration and rule of the state.  The philosophy is 
reflected in oaths two and four, which describes the soldier’s role as a keeper and defender of the 
nation’s ideology, as well as his obligation to serve as the nation’s guardian.  Many militaries 
have similar oaths to defend country and ideals, but the difference is that the Sapta Marga 
implies that the understanding of the true “soul” of the nation rests with the military, a 
responsibility that lends itself to a role of particular power.  The military, then, is not a servant of 
the people, and not subordinate to a government, but rather a caretaker who has the duty to 
ensure that the nation is not threatened by deviation from Pancasila and the “state ideology.”44  
 This element of superior purpose traces back to the sense of eliteness imbued in the 
PETA units. While there were numerous other pro-independence forces, none had the training 
and resultant credibility of being a truly indigenous military for the Indonesian nation.  They 
were indoctrinated to consider themselves as the heroic, self-sacrificing vanguard of the struggle 
for Indonesian independence. They were the true leaders of the revolution.  
 The sense of being from, yet superior to, a civilian populace became an ingrained 
organizational attitude that deepened over time.  During the revolution, when Nasution’s nascent 
guerrilla warfare doctrine was being put into practice in the field, TKR units imbedded 
themselves down to the village level, in a partnership of military and civilian authority.  But as 
Nugroho Notosusanto points out, it was always the military that was “the senior partner on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     43 For example see Benedict Anderson, Java; Ruth McVey, “Transformation” part I; Rudolf Mrazek, The United 
States and the Indonesian Military 1945-1965; Sundhaussen, Road to Power, 270 
     44 Compare, for example, to the U.S. Army’s soldier’s oath, in which one swears to “support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States,” and to “obey the orders of the President...and the orders of the officers appointed 
over me.”   
	   60 
team” (Struggle 126).  This approach to territorial guerrilla warfare, first codified in Nasution’s 
Principles and later made official national doctrine in Sistem Pertahanan Semesta (Total 
People’s Defense System), created a permanent organizational structure that reflected this belief.  
Thus, despite the frequent rhetoric about kemanunggalan TNI dengan rakyat (the military’s unity 
with the people), the relationship was more akin to the old bapak-anak buah pattern.  The gap 
between stated ideals and underlying behaviors was ironically deepened in the post-PETA 
generation.  Whereas most PETA officers had indeed come from the desa, the newer generation 
of officers represented a highly selective elite more distant from Indonesian society at large.45  
During the New Order’s drive for national modernization and development this relationship 
became increasingly fixed, as the rapidly modernizing and comparatively well-off military 
carried out its “duty” to bring up the standard of living of the general populace.  In practice, 
however, “the army elite itself became a neo-feudal class” (Utrecht 178-81).  
 The constant struggle between civilian elites and military leaders throughout the 
revolution and post-independence period further ingrained the sense of military superiority.  The 
“betrayal” of the merdeka atau mati (freedom or death) commitment of the pemuda struggle by 
the civilian elites, who had capitulated and negotiated with the Dutch enemy during the 
revolutionary struggle, became mythologized in TNI history as the original sin that justified the 
military’s premier role in “safeguarding” the nation.  Furthermore, civilian-led, parliamentary 
style of government was widely seen as a failure in the eyes of PETA generation military 
leaders, who were suspicious of the factionalism and partisanship produced in the new 
democratic process.  This destructive internal discord also infected the military, and was at odds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     45 See Sundhaussen, The Military in Indonesia, p. 62.  He cites that in 1974, only 267 new cadets were selected 
for all four service branches, out of a pool of more than 20,000 candidates.  See also MacGregor 137 for a personal 
observation of the interaction of new generation of TNI cadets with the local community.   
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with the “total unity” required for a successful national struggle that for many had not ended.   
Among the military, these pathologies justified the TNI’s active role in governance.   
 The similarities in the TNI’s attitude toward the government and civilians with the pre-
World War II Imperial Japanese Army are striking.  While the link is not directly causal, it is 
probable that the deep impression left on PETA recruits by their Japanese mentors would have 
extended beyond official instruction, and that the Japanese civil-military model would have been 
informally learned through example.  Many authors, such as Benedict Anderson, have noted this 
connection, and anecdotal evidence suggests its validity:   
The Peta had been nurtured in the Japanese tradition, and by that tradition, at least 
in the latter days of the Empire, the effective head of the army, the chief of staff, 
was chosen by consultations among the senior officers from which civilians were 
rigidly excluded.  Moreover, the chief of staff was not subordinated to the 
Japanese cabinet but reported directly to the Emperor.  From the start Sudirman 
made every effort to live up to this tradition. He regarded himself as coequal to 
the cabinet leaders, not subordinate to them, and in this interpretation of his role 
received strong support from within the army.  In effect, Sudirman strengthened 
his personal position within the military by emphasizing the special position of 
the army as a whole within the government and the revolutionary movement. 
(Java 244)  
 
 The decades of post-independence internal conflict and factionalism, as well as the 
constant struggle against regional rebellions, fostered something of an obsessive institutional fear 
of disunity, weakness, and disintegration.  This was understandable given the circumstances.  
But this institutional insecurity, when combined with the deepening TNI attitudes towards its 
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relationship with the populace, resulted in an institutional culture in which civilians needed to be 
controlled rather than served.  
 It should be remembered, too, that many of the methods of internal state control through 
special police and intelligence also have their roots in the PETA period.  Prior to the end of 
World War II, the Japanese Army had begun to develop special intelligence units under the 
umbrella of PETA.  Some PETA officers received significant intelligence training, such as 
Zukifli Lubis, Indonesia’s first spy chief and later Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, who spent 
several months in Singapore under direct mentorship from Japanese intelligence officers 
(Conboy, Intel 15-16).  Many Indonesian officers also served as auxiliaries to the Japanese 
special police, the Kempetai, who had a reputation for brutal coercive methods. 
 The TNI’s relationship with the civilian populace also supported one other recurring 
organizational norm: the use of civilians as auxiliaries in the use of force, either as coerced help 
(as in pagar betis), or recruited as militias or youth gangs.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the use of civilian militias was the natural outgrowth of the PETA-trained army’s experiences 
during the revolution.  The successful use of conscripted local civilians in suppressing rebellions 
strengthened this inclination.  During the 1965-66 purges and throughout the New Order, 
however, the use of civilians to “outsource” violence took on a different character, and became 
increasingly a means of population control through coercion and terror (Anderson, Violence 15-
18).   
 
The Primacy of Semangat 
 The importance of semangat as the essential characteristic for military success is the most 
evident organizational value that can directly be attributed to the PETA experience.  Ben 
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Anderson, among others, has noted the resonance of semangat and Japanese warrior culture with 
existing Javanese cultural beliefs and the ksatria tradition: 
At the same time, the impact of the Japanese style was powerfully enhanced by 
the familiar traditional resonances it evoked. The great importance attached by the 
Japanese military to spiritual strength has already been noted. Official spokesmen 
never tired of stressing its superiority over technological skills and material 
prosperity. In countless lectures and speeches they insisted that victory in the war 
and independence for Indonesia depended on the semangat (spiritual power) and 
discipline of the Indonesian people themselves. The similarity between these 
ideas and traditional Javanese conceptions of power as cosmic energy, to be 
concentrated and accumulated by ascetic purity and spiritual discipline, was quite 
apparent. The value attached to semangat also implied a contempt for the 
rationalist calculus of marginal advantage, and conversely, a confirmation of the 
traditional importance ascribed to sudden inspiration (ilham). The new prestige of 
the military in the occupation order could also be seen as a kind of restoration. 
Under the Dutch the native military had been merely the abject and mercenary 
appendages of colonial power. But in the collective memory of precolonial 
greatness, constantly renewed by the wajang shadow-plays, the warrior-knight, 
selfless and valiant, was remembered as the guarantor of society’s happiness and 
prosperity. The fact that these ancient ideas seemed to be reflected in the state 
doctrines of the Japanese Empire can only have reinforced the sense of their 
inherent truth. (Java 32-33) 
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 Anderson notes the resonance of Japanese spiritual values in order to illustrate the 
awakening of a latent Indonesian revolutionary psyche.  But for the PETA soldiers in particular, 
the belief in semangat did not only accord with cultural values, but was naturally an 
indispensible characteristic in facing the realities of guerrilla warfare, with its inherent 
asymmetry of physical resources.  Semangat was as much a tool and weapon as a rifle, and the 
lack of material power could be balanced by superior spiritual power.46  Synonymous with 
“revolutionary spirit,” in his Principles of Guerrilla Warfare, Nasution frequently mentions the 
importance of cultivating and maintaining semangat as the essential condition for victory in 
guerrilla warfare.  
 But the reliance on semangat to overcome material disadvantages had unexpected 
consequences for the organizational culture of the TNI, just as it had for the IJA.  The devotion 
to semangat sometimes led to a disdain or even rejection of logic, reason, analysis, and 
technology as elements of Western imperialism.  During the revolution, this put the PETA 
generation at odds with Western-educated, modernist civilian elites, who maintained a more 
rationalist attitude towards resolving the war.  One such official declared that, “Japanese flattery 
has exaggerated the importance of semangat beyond all limits, and has derided and aroused 
hatred for akal [reason], as though akal were simply a Western invention,”47 and that “the 
semangat people, who advocated sending pemuda armed with bamboo spears against Allied 
troops with machine guns, were stupid, if not criminal”48 (310-311).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     46 This characteristic persists in the modern TNI, although in official planning semangat is replaced by the word 
moril (morale).  Morale is often the decisive factor in war-gaming exercises, in which the enemy is assessed to be 
technologically and numerically superior, but expected to lose due to weak moril and the TNI's always-superior 
semangat.  Author’s personal observation at SESKOAD, 2010. 
     47 Sjafrudin Prawiranegara, quoted in Anderson, Java, p. 310 (the quote appears in footnote 1 of Chapter 14).   
     48 The second quote is Anderson’s paraphrasing of Sjafrudin’s remarks. 
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 During the post-independence period, too, the conflict between semangat and akal played 
out in the push to modernize the TNI, as a significant element of ex-PETA members rejected 
“the cold rules of a modern military training advocated by Nasution, Simpatupang” and others 
(Utrecht 43).  There were other factors in this resistance, such as the loss of livelihood for many 
of the under-educated and lesser-qualified freedom fighters who had fought in the “spirit of the 
1945 Revolution.”  But the conflict went to the heart of what many of the PETA generation 
viewed as the foremost characteristic of an Indonesian soldier.  Namely, that an Indonesian 
soldier should be judged on the ardor of his revolutionary spirit, his semangat, and not his class, 
education level, or even professional knowledge.  In the PETA generation’s mythology, 
semangat had won the war. 
 Modernization eventually won out in the formal structure of the military, but the 
underlying adherence to semangat never disappeared, and often served as a catchall excuse for 
the failure to fully grasp the lessons and technologies of a modern military.49  Despite the fact 
that by 1965, nearly 2,800 officers had undertaken training in the U.S., and the Indonesian 
military had adopted much of U.S. and Western training models and programs for its own 
schools, the absorption of that training into the body of TNI remained uneven (Evans 40, 44).50  
Unlike other fields such as economics, where a small group of technocratic elite can greatly 
shape the direction and development of a nation51, the absorption of military education in an 
army is realized only through widespread and repetitive application in either training or 
operations.  In other words, a military is what it practices and does, which not necessarily the 
same as what is written in its manuals.  And for the greater part of the TNI in its early decades 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     49 The same problem had plagued the IJA, as noted earlier, when the overemphasis on seishin led to neglect of 
some critical aspects of military science.     
     50 I am using figures from Evans’ article; however, he comes to a different conclusion regarding the impact of the 
training.   
     51 For example, the "Berkeley Mafia" during the New Order. 
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(despite the significant outward changes in the military education system and structure) there 
was an enormous gap between what was taught and what was practiced.  Although the TNI 
adopted many of the tactical doctrines from the U.S., the TNI was not sufficiently structured to 
fight as a conventional force, nor were the new doctrines aligned with its actual experiences in 
counter-guerrilla warfare.52  Furthermore, as one TNI general pointed out, it was nearly 
impossible to teach a soldier how to operate a tank when he had never even used a telephone 
(Lowry 90).53 The lessons that were learned most, then, were the same ones that the Japanese 
had instilled: hard physical training, rote discipline, basic small-unit tactics, and above all, the 
importance of semangat.  
 
Searching for the Roots of a “Culture of Violence”  
 A central paradox of the TNI is the difference between its stated core value of “oneness 
with the population,” and its historical use of extreme violence against its own citizens (however 
nominal or contentious their status as “citizen” may be, as in the case of East Timor).  In 
accounting for the violence, much of the criticism of the New Order has been leveled at its 
official policies of violent internal repression and disappearances, such as in the case of the 
Petrus killings.  Human rights and other groups claim that these draconian policies were 
intentionally carried out on a genocidal scale in East Timor, but it is doubtful that killing as much 
as one-third of the Timorese population was any directed official policy.54   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     52 A prime difference being that U.S. doctrine since the Civil War has been based on the idea of an expeditionary 
war, not an internal conflict.   
     53 Lowry is citing Major General T.B. Silalahi from “Ancaman, Postur ABRI dan Teknologi,” Karya Vira Jati, 
No. 76-77, 1992.  p. 164 
     54 See Geoffrey Robinson, If you leave us here we will die, 2012; and Robert Cribb, “From total people’s defence 
to massacre: Explaining Indonesian military violence in East Timor,” in Colombijn and Lindbld (eds.), Roots of 
Violence in Indonesia, 2002. 
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 Other scholars have searched deeper for the roots of this “culture of violence.”   There are 
those, including some Indonesians, who cite ancient pre-colonial cultural predispositions, 
claiming that explosions of extreme violence were “part of an Indonesian cultural pattern of 
‘running amok’” (Robinson, Genocide 12).55  Others claim that communal violence was a 
byproduct of the brutal state suppression during the Dutch colonial period, or the Japanese 
occupation.  As Benedict Anderson points out in the introduction to Violence and the State in 
Suharto’s Indonesia, a 70-year-old Indonesian woman would have directly experienced the 
police state Dutch colonial rule; Japanese occupation; national revolutionary war; repeated 
internecine violence based on race, class or religion; numerous rebellions and uprisings; the 
1965-66 killings; state violence in the New Order; the resurgence of religious and separatist 
violence in Sulawesi, Moluccas, Papua, and Aceh; and the widespread rioting in 1998 (9-10).  
Geoffrey Robinson, writes that:  
past violence can significantly increase the likelihood of future violence. That is 
partly because the experience or memory of violence can help to create or deepen 
a sense of group identity and enmity. In part too it is because history, including 
memories of past violence, provides the essential raw material for political leaders 
seeking to mobilize populations to take part in or at least acquiesce to mass 
violence. Crucially, historical experience and memory also provide the 
organizational and behavioral models as well as the rhetorical tool kit that are the 
foundation of future violence, and shape its character. (13)  
 
 In searching for the causes of the TNI’s culture of violence, however, I want to 
distinguish between the violence conducted by civilians at large and that directed and conducted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     55 Robinson cites the comments of Major General Zacky Anwar to journalists in 2000, regarding the post-ballot 
violence in East Timor.   
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by the TNI (while recognizing that the two are frequently related).  Certainly, TNI soldiers as 
members of the Indonesian society would be affected by the same factors as other citizens.  
However, lumping together both kinds of violence obscures a specific recurring motif in the 
TNI’s history.  Following in the model of Geoffrey Robinson and Robert Cribb, I propose that 
the nature and level of violence that resulted in the large-scale deaths in East Timor was an 
expression of the TNI’s military organizational culture, which had developed since its origins in 
PETA.  More specifically, I argue that the structural foundation of PETA training and guerrilla 
warfare mentality instilled certain attitudes and expressions of violence that were reinforced 
through the successive decades of conflict.   
 Of course, all militaries are structures for the organization and control of violence.  Yet 
there is a clear difference between a conventional and a guerrilla army, and an even greater 
difference with an army that subscribes to guerrilla warfare as a core national doctrine.  Whereas 
nearly all conventional armies bind themselves to international conventions, laws of warfare, and 
international norms for acceptable conduct in war, guerrilla warfare is intrinsically outside the 
bounds of “civilized” combat and makes use of methods illegal under conventional norms.56  As 
Nasution wrote regarding the “scorched earth” policy of guerrilla warfare, “burning, sabotage, 
killing and kidnapping at the expense of the enemy have a heroic value” (Fundamentals 50).  
The TNI’s culture, being rooted in a guerrilla warfare identity, leads to organized but unbounded 
violence.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     56 Although Indonesia signed on as a party to the 1949 Geneva Convention (in 1958), this has had no effect on its 
underlying military culture derived from its roots as a guerrilla force.  Additionally, the convention applies to 
international conflicts, which in Indonesia’s case would only apply to its konfrontasi with Malaysia, the conflict 
over Papua with the Dutch, and East Timor in the eyes of the international community.  Interestingly, Indonesia has 
not yet signed on to the three amendment protocols.  Protocol I (1977) specifically outlaws indiscriminate attacks on 
civilian populations, or their sources of food, water, and survival, and clarifies the status of guerrilla forces. 
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 The brutal methods of the TNI are not, of course, limited to Indonesia, and many Western 
nations went through periods using the same kinds of tactics.  The British, French, and German 
armies all used “scorched earth” tactics in counter-guerrilla and counter-insurgency warfare.  In 
Indonesia, however, like Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan, recurring experiences reinforced 
that “the dynamic toward extremes was (unintentionally) built into the system” (Hull 165).   
 Nearly all of the TNI’s combat experiences were against guerrillas, often mixed into the 
civilian population.  Under such circumstances, in applying the scorched earth methods of the 
independence struggle, it was inevitable that suppression meant that civilians were frequently 
killed due to real or presumed association with the enemy.  The PETA generation’s own values 
held that soldiers were freedom fighters and members of the Indonesian populace first.  Thus, 
placed in the reverse role, the TNI fought guerrillas as guerrillas, fulfilling Nasution’s axiom that 
“the guerrilla must be fought with his own tactics.”  The next chapter illustrates this in the case 
of East Timor.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE TNI IN EAST TIMOR 
 
 The Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975 constituted the single largest and most 
intensive military campaign in the nation’s history, and the greatest test of its capability to 
function as a modern armed forces.  Preceded by months of propaganda operations, 
psychological warfare, unconventional warfare using Timorese militias, and low-level 
skirmishes, Indonesia ultimately invaded East Timor on December 7, 1975, beginning what 
would become a 24-year long occupation and ultimately unsuccessful attempt at integration.   
 The TNI’s57 actions in East Timor offer a unique case study of the effects of its military 
culture.  While Indonesia had continuously engaged in anti-separatist and anti-guerrilla warfare 
throughout its post-independence history to that time, the East Timor campaign was the TNI’s 
first and only large-scale, full-spectrum, total military effort.  This means that, for the first time, 
the TNI was functioning as a conventional military force.  In many ways, it succeeded in doing 
so.  And yet, despite the effort to apply modern military technology and tactics, the behavior of 
the TNI often belied its projected image, and indeed its self-perception, as an army that had 
outgrown its guerrilla roots.  The timing of the invasion, too, is useful from a generational 
standpoint: the early years of the East Timor campaign marked the career end of the last PETA 
generation military officers still in power, and the early operations were all directed by Generasi 
’45 officers.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     57 During the New Order, the Indonesian military’s name was changed to Angkatan Bersenjata Republik 
Indonesia (ABRI), and included the police forces as a part of the armed forces.  For simplicity, I have maintained 
the usage of the name TNI (although not the official name during this period) to indicate my focus on the military 
alone.  Additionally, my references to TNI should be understood in most cases as applying to the ground forces 
component, which is the army and to a lesser degree, the Marines. 
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 Histories of the war in East Timor from the TNI’s perspective tend to be hagiographic 
and focus on technical details of the conflict, emphasizing a professional military’s adaptive 
attempts to defeat a stubborn resistance, and the ideological goal of fighting insecurity and 
instability instigated by Communist separatists.  Yet these histories ignore the comprehensive 
evidence that points to a brutal occupation in which as much as one-third of the Timorese 
population died, and was consistently marked by terrible human rights abuses.  While a full 
accounting of events is complicated by the fact that the internal TNI records regarding East 
Timor have remained closely guarded, and many operations seem to have been conducted 
without formal written orders,58 the sum of all the testimonies to Indonesian brutality, 
destruction, torture, and unlawful killing is too overwhelming to be dismissed.  Even after the 
Indonesian government opened up East Timor to foreign observers and journalists beginning in 
1989, long after the worst of the fighting was over, repeated incidents of TNI excess such as the 
Dili Massacre of 1991 give lie to the assertion that these were anomalous events, but rather an 
ingrained pattern of behavior.   
 The gap between the two perspectives, in fact, can be interpreted as the space between 
the TNI’s stated beliefs and self-perception, and the actual expression of its underlying norms 
through its conduct.  The TNI’s understanding of its actions in East Timor was filtered through 
its institutional culture, and its histories of the war reflect a belief of legitimate purpose that 
cannot simply be attributed only to New Order indoctrination.  Rather, the TNI’s history of 
guerrilla and anti-guerrilla conflict shaped an “invisible” understanding of the way that it was 
supposed to conduct war, in which its practices of “scorched earth” were an unacknowledged 
default.  These practices are thrown into sharp relief in the East Timor campaign because, unlike 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     58 Ken Conboy quotes former New Order general and Kopassus commander Prabowo Subianto as saying, 
“Indonesia is the best country for conducting covert operations because there are no written orders.”  Kopassus, 316. 
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in earlier, post-revolution internal operations to suppress rebellions, by 1975 the TNI purported 
itself to be a modern military built upon modern U.S. and Western doctrine and equipment.   
 
Background to the Indonesian Occupation 
 In the 500 years of Portuguese colonization, East Timor59 was administered with the bare 
minimum of effort and investment, with a skeletal colonial bureaucracy ruling largely through 
existing tribal structures.  By 1974, there were still only 30 kilometers of paved road in the entire 
country; less than one percent of the population had more than elementary level education; and 
the capital city, Dili, had only developed electrical infrastructure within the past decade (Conboy, 
Kopassus 195).   
 In 1974, however, the Portuguese government was overthrown in a coup led by a group 
of military officers embittered by their experiences in the country’s anti-independence wars in 
the African colonies.  This was soon coupled with popular support for regime change, so 
decolonization became a priority for the new government in Lisbon.  Although East Timor was 
barely an afterthought in the scope of Portugal’s colonial holdings, the specter of impending 
decolonization drastically changed the political calculus for Suharto’s New Order government.   
 Following Portugal’s coup, political organizations emerged for the first time in East 
Timor, quickly coalescing into three main parties that represented the different decolonization 
options facing the territory.  The Unaio Democratica Timorense (UDT) favored a deliberate and 
measured process, in which Timor would progressively become autonomous while remaining 
under Portuguese governance.  The UDT also later adopted the goal of eventual independence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     59 Known prior to integration with Indonesia as Portuguese Timor.  
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(Singh, Myths 21-22).  The Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN)60 
called for immediate independence, and stressed Timorese nationalism and the right to self-
determination.  The Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense (APODETI) argued for 
integration with Indonesia, under the logic that the Timorese were one people and one culture 
artificially divided by colonialism. They believed that East Timor was unviable as an 
independent state, and therefore, union with Indonesia was the most beneficial and realistic 
outcome.  Although FRETILIN quickly became the most popular party, its somewhat radical 
rhetoric and perceived tint of Marxism drew the wariness of Indonesia and others in the 
international community (22-23). 
 Since independence, the Indonesian government had consistently recognized Portugal’s 
sovereignty in East Timor and disavowed any interest in the territory.  But contemporaneous 
regional events in Southeast Asia, at the height of the Cold War, prompted a change in 
Indonesian perceptions of East Timor’s importance.  The U.S. was withdrawing from its long 
war in Vietnam, and within a year of East Timor’s independence, both Saigon and Phnom Penh 
would fall to Communist rule.  For the New Order’s military and national elites, who only seven 
years prior had experienced Indonesia’s own bloody anti-Communist purge, avoidance of 
internal instability was an obsession.  An unstable, undeveloped, newly independent state 
susceptible to leftist influence that could threaten to turn East Timor into Indonesia’s Cuba was 
unacceptable (59).  From the New Order’s perspective, pre-emptive efforts to integrate East 
Timor made even greater sense, and Indonesia gained tacit agreement from other nations with a 
stake in regional stability, such as Australia and the United States.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     60 The party was originally known as the Associacao Social Democratica Timorense (ASDT), but changed its 
name to FRETILIN within four months.   
	   74 
 The TNI undertook this pre-emption beginning in late 1974 through a low-key 
clandestine effort named “Operation Komodo.”  Conceived by Generals Yoga Sugama, the head 
of the national intelligence service (BAKIN—Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara), and his 
deputy Ali Murtopo, both Generasi ’45 officers and influential members of Suharto’s inner 
circle, the operation involved intelligence collection in East Timor, financial support for 
APODETI and select members of the UDT, pro-Indonesia propaganda broadcasts, and other 
subversion operations to influence internal Timorese politics (Conboy, Kopassus 198).  As the 
political climate in East Timor continued to shift unpredictably, and as FRETILIN became 
increasingly popular, other generals began preparing more direct methods of intervention.  
Beginning in early 1975, General Benny Murdani directed the formation of a new covert, special 
forces-led effort that was known as “Operation Flamboyan.”  The operation involved training 
APODETI and other Timorese partisan recruits as paramilitary forces, as well as collecting 
tactical intelligence along the border.   
 In August 1975, a brief civil war broke out in East Timor following an attempted coup by 
the UDT that sought to dislodge FRETILIN from their local power base.  Among the factors 
leading to this was Indonesia’s aggressive courting of UDT leaders and continued 
characterization of FRETILIN as a radical socialist group.61  The civil war resulted in FRETILIN 
pushing UDT and other opposition groups into West Timor, leaving FRETILIN in political and 
military control of East Timor.  Their hand having been forced, UDT leaders signed a petition in 
September calling for the integration of East Timor with Indonesia.  Meanwhile, clashes along 
the border between FRETILIN and various UDT and APODETI forces under Flamboyan heated 
up.  This led the TNI to ramp up its intervention plans, and in September it developed a larger 
invasion campaign plan called “Operation Seroja,” under which the existing “Flamboyan” was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 In the New Order, the government made little, if any, differentiation between socialists and communists.   
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subsumed.  In October and November, Indonesian-led forces attacked and seized the East Timor 
border villages of Batugade, Balibo, and Atabae.   
 Already in a de-facto state of war, FRETILIN declared East Timor an independent state 
on November 28.  The following day, UDT and APODETI leaders in West Timor, with 
Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik, formally declared that East Timor was integrating with 
Indonesia.  On December 7, 1975, Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion into East Timor.   
 
Operation Seroja  
 The initial invasion of East Timor was a complex, joint operation involving all branches 
of the Indonesian Armed Forces, and included some 15,000 troops armed with modern weaponry 
and equipment.  An airborne assault by a combined force of Kopassandha and Kostrad units 
directly into the city was coordinated with marine amphibious landings, and joined by several 
ground units from the territorial Brawijaya and Silawangi divisions, all supported by air force 
and navy elements.  By most accounts, the operation was a disastrous display of military 
ineptitude,62 which succeeded in its goal of taking Dili only through the overwhelming 
application of force, and because FRETILIN had long decided to cede the city in the event of an 
invasion in order to retreat into the hills (Dunn 70).  While chaos is always present on the 
battlefield, the TNI’s invasion plan disintegrated almost from the start, resulting in ad hoc 
execution on the ground, and soldiers lacking command and control acting instead by instinct.  
Although the operation had been planned according to doctrine similar to a comparable U.S. 
operation, the invasion revealed that the TNI was still very much a territorial army with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     62 Even General Benny Murdani later characterized the operation as unprofessional : “These troops had no 
discipline at all.  They shot one another.  Ah, over all it was totally embarrassing.”  Quoted in Julius Pour, Benny 
Moerdani: Profile of a Soldier Statesman, 1993.   
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guerrilla warfare identity.  In other words, the TNI performed not what its soldiers had been 
taught to do, but what they had been practicing to do through the military culture that they had 
absorbed.  And what was supposed to be a demonstration of the TNI’s conventional military 
capability devolved into “a savage battle with much plunder, looting, and violence” (Singh, 
Myths 47).     
 Problems plagued the mission from the start.  Despite months of intelligence collection 
and reconnaissance, the plan was based on poor intelligence analysis, with little preparation.  The 
TNI was apparently unaware that the Portuguese military garrison in Dili had been stocked with 
modern NATO weaponry and ammunition, by one estimate equaling 15,000 light weapons, 
which were left behind when the Portuguese evacuated Dili and were now in FRETILIN control 
(Pour 335).  The intelligence that “Operation Komodo” operatives collected likely would have 
tended towards political intelligence, more useful for internal state security and territorial 
operations.  For example, one Operation Komodo officer noted that, “the FRETILIN office in 
Dili had a stack of Mao Tse-tung’s red books on offer” (Conboy, Kopassus 197).  Yet, basic 
military intelligence data about terrain and weather patterns, and enemy strengths and 
capabilities was limited and inaccurate: 
Combat Detachment 1 was briefed on the latest intelligence at Cijantung.  
“Sun Tzu said to know thy enemy, the terrain, and the climate,” said Captain 
Soembodo, the Batu Jajar operations assistant now serving on Suweno’s 
Kogasgab staff.  “We did not know enough about any of these.” 
Case in point was information fed to Kopassandha about the Komoro River.  
Flowing into the sea just west of Dili, the Komoro, briefing officers at Cijantung 
reported, was at flood stage and brimming with crocodiles.  Lacking a proper 
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bridge, the river would be all but impossible to ford given the alleged presence of 
these man-eating reptiles. 
The Kopassandha audience was also soft-sold on the resistance they would 
likely face.  “They told us that the Timorese would see the parachute canopies and 
clap, and we would have a victory parade the next day.” (241) 
 These deficiencies reflect more than ineptitude or incompetence: they reflect the TNI’s 
cultural views on military intelligence and analysis.  All of the elements of intelligence planning 
for an operation found in a U.S. military manual—terrain, weather, enemy capabilities, etc.—
would likely have been covered during the briefing described above.  Yet the analysis behind the 
checklist of facts is what makes the information useful.  Despite the fact that a number of officers 
had attended U.S. military schools over the preceding decade, the TNI’s educational system, 
with its emphasis on rote learning and appearance over function, had trained a generation of 
officers to observe the form of military doctrine but not its underlying intent.  Here, this 
manifested itself in a wildly unrealistic assessment of environmental and enemy conditions in 
East Timor.   Additionally, in the Indonesian military’s intelligence system, founded on its 
territorial guerrilla warfare roots, such granular, local knowledge is implicit since the army 
operates in its own area.  Intelligence in that case is the natural outcome of deep familiarity.  But 
this time, the TNI was attempting to operate as a conventional military in foreign territory.  Once 
again, the TNI performed as it had been practicing for decades, in contradiction to its new 
doctrinal manuals, and its soldiers’ fundamental conception of military intelligence was at odds 
with their required mission.   
 The operation was further complicated by a lack of coordination and communication, 
both between units and within them.  While the organization of TNI combat units, particularly 
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the non-territorial Kostrad and Kopassandha, mimicked U.S. and British force structures, these 
units were never trained or employed in the manner of the Western units they were modeled on.  
“Within Kostrad, theoretically the army’s spearhead, the problem was particularly acute. Due to 
the expenses involved, Kostrad’s two airborne brigades rarely had the opportunity to exercise as 
a coherent whole; rather, they were usually wielded as individual battalions” (Conboy, Kopassus 
238).  Having never been required to operate together before, much less for a large-scale 
invasion, synchronization evaporated on the ground and individual units acted of their own 
volition, sometimes in opposition to mission objectives (248).  Although there are no official 
TNI reports of fratricide during the operation, given the chaos and lack of communication 
between units, some degree of friendly fire death almost certainly took place.  For example, 
during one parachute drop of Kostrad soldiers near the Komoro River, the paratroopers began 
shooting and tossing grenades down on a unit below that turned out to be a TNI amphibious task 
force, some members of which began shooting back despite the fact that it was clear the 
parachutists were TNI soldiers63 (248; Subroto170).   
  Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the operation, and a harbinger of things to come, 
was the conduct of TNI soldiers who reverted almost immediately to “scorched earth” practices.  
Widespread looting, raping, burning of homes and buildings, as well as summary executions and 
random killing of civilians were reported in numerous witness and survivor interviews.  In a 
disquieting echo of the 1965-66 massacres, the TNI is reported to have killed entire families on 
the suspicion of FRETILIN sympathies, because “they were infected with the seeds of 
FRETILIN” (Dunn testimony in U.S. Congress Hearing 1977, 30).  Estimates of the invasion’s 
death toll vary, but according to one estimate, around 2,000 civilians in Dili were killed in the 
first few days of the invasion alone, with several hundred Chinese members of the city 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     63 FRETILIN, of course, had no air capability.   
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particularly being singled out (Budiardjo and Liong 128).64  This is all the more troubling in light 
of the fact that FRETILIN forces had largely abandoned the capital early on the first day, and the 
fighting in the city itself was over relatively quickly, giving even greater credence to the charges 
that Indonesian soldiers undertook such actions systematically and without facing any direct 
threat.   
 In spite of the invasion’s conduct, the TNI succeeded in capturing Dili and subsequently 
other major population centers, while steadily bringing in more troops.  By April 1976, TNI 
troop numbers in East Timor were estimated at 32,000, more than double the original invasion 
force size (23).  Yet, despite its vast numerical superiority, after eight months the TNI had only 
managed to clear the major villages and towns.  FRETILIN still controlled 80 percent of the 
country outside of the population centers, and was exacting a high price on the TNI during its 
crawling push into the hinterlands.   
 
Scorched Earth Warfare  
 Once the TNI firmly established its hold on the major towns and villages, it began a long 
counter-guerrilla campaign punctuated by several periods of intensive operations to destroy 
FRETILIN resistance.  The first of these occurred from September 1977 to March 1979, and 
consisted of three major offensives to encircle and reduce the area under resistance control.  The 
intensity of these operations was of a new dimension, even compared to the initial invasion, due 
to the Indonesian acquisition of several shipments of U.S. military equipment in 1976 and 1977.  
Primary among these were 16 OV-10 Bronco aircraft, a light attack and observation plane that 
was specially designed for counter-insurgency operations.  These were followed in 1978 by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     64 The authors cite Dunn, Timor, A People Betrayed, as a source for this figure.   
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purchase of eight British Hawk and 16 American A-4 Skyhawk jets (Budiarjo and Liong, 30).  
With this new arsenal, the TNI conducted aerial bombardment campaigns unprecedented in its 
history. These included the use of napalm (27; Conboy, Kopassus 276).65   
 But despite the technological advances and increased lethality, TNI counter-guerrilla 
attitudes and techniques were much the same, if different in scale.  The same guerrilla scorched 
earth tactics the TNI had always used were simply disguised by the new terminology and 
equipment of the military.  From the beginning, the TNI attempted to “Timorise” the war, using 
locally developed militias to fight in conjunction with regular forces (Budiarjo and Liong 39).  
Already by 1976, two Timorese infantry battalions had been formed and a civil defense corps 
program called Hansip (Pertahanan Sipil) was being expanded.  The development of local 
militias continued to expand after 1979, when the TNI established a Korem (sub-regional 
military command) in East Timor as one of its provinces.  In addition to the use of Timorese 
recruits in military formations, the TNI also developed unofficial local militias and gangs as 
proxies to control the population through subversion, terror, propaganda, and targeted killing.  
This pattern had its roots in the revolutionary period, as noted in previous chapters.  For 
example, consider the following description of one PETA officer during the revolution, who 
became notorious for his use of local groups to conduct brutal population control measures: 
The chief instruments for this activity were villagers, sometimes led by serving or 
former TNI men.  It was frequently a harsh and destructive method in which the 
distinctions between military action and rampok were largely invisible to the 
populace.  Another tactic on which Sungkono came to rely very heavily was the 
use of local groups (and sometimes individuals) to kidnap and often kill civilian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     65 The napalm used by the TNI is mentioned as a footnote (f.n. 19 in Chapter 18) in Conboy, who describes it as a 
Soviet-made variant called “Opalm” that Indonesia had acquired in the early 1960s.   
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officials and others who were not cooperative or who showed signs of working 
for or being sympathetic to the Dutch.  These tactics were not only brutal, they 
also became remarkably bureaucratized.  By the time of the climax of the 
Revolution in the latter half of 1949, for example, TNI officers were sending 
off—from their guerrilla strongholds in the mountains or deep in the 
countryside—typed, stamped, and sometimes thumbprinted orders; for example, 
‘Go to daerah [area] X and organize resistance’ or ‘Murder Pak L__’.66   
These policies had disastrous effects.  Sungkono’s command and the core 
units of the TNI in East Java were never able to control the violence they had 
summoned to life.  Efforts to direct forces of violence by absorbing them into the 
TNI . . . were rarely successful and often created more rather than less conflict . . . 
Draconian measures such as burning villages and crops quickly got out of hand, 
and the TNI became increasingly unpopular in precisely those areas where it most 
needed broad support.  (Frederick 165-66) 
 The TNI’s instrumental use of civilians once again involved use of the pagar betis 
technique, which had been used first during the Darul Islam campaign, and later in the 1965-66 
killings (Robinson, “People’s War” 291).  The TNI resurrected this technique after 1980, when 
FRETILIN regrouped and reorganized under the leadership of Xanana Gusmao following its 
near decimation in 1977-1979, and began conducting numerous highly effective guerrilla attacks 
(Budiarjo and Liong 41).  In response, the TNI launched another major operation from May to 
September 1981, Operasi Keamanan (Operation Security), involving some 12 TNI battalions 
and an estimated 33,000 to 50,000 Timorese civilians (41-42; Conboy, Kopassus 298).  The key 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     66 Author cites the following sources for this: MvD-CAD, MB B31 311, Interrogation report SHK8/2468/10-12-
1948, and Interrogation report SHK8/1804/30-6-1948; MvD-CAD, VALIGG49 163.  
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to the operation was the formation of two pagar betis lines stretching across the island—one 
starting in the east and the other in the west—to sweep the resistance into a killing zone near the 
center of the island.   
 The operation was a failure, both militarily and strategically.  According to one estimate, 
nearly “the entire male population from the ages of 15 to 50 was pressed into service” (Budiarjo 
and Liong 42).  The operation failed to affect significantly FRETILIN capability or to capture 
any key leaders.  The conscription of Timorese manpower caused enormous resentment and 
strengthened support for FRETILIN, in addition to further disrupting agricultural activities and 
worsening a food crisis.  The failure to eliminate the resistance, however, simply resulted in the 
TNI applying even more punitive measures with the same tactics.  In 1983, the TNI launched its 
third large-scale offensive, Operasi Persatuan (Operation Unity), again involving heavy aerial 
bombardment, pagar betis, and forced relocation.   
 The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste 
(CAVR) estimates that between 84,200 and 183,000 East Timorese died from hunger or illness 
during the Indonesian occupation, with the vast majority of deaths occurring in the early years 
from 1975-1979 (CAVR Executive Summary, 73).  Other estimates indicate that there may have 
been more than 200,000 deaths (Budiarjo and Liong 81).  After the invasion, swaths of farmland 
were destroyed, along with much of the livestock on which crop cultivation depended (84-85).  
Thousands of Timorese were dislocated from their homes, either in their own attempt to escape 
bombing and ground operations, or due to forcible relocation by the TNI into daerah pemukiman 
(resettlement areas) in Indonesian-held territory.   
 Resettlement camps were a new aspect of TNI counter-insurgency operations designed to 
“separate the guerrilla from his support.”  It is likely that the TNI developed this strategy from 
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the use of the “New Villages” in the British Malayan Emergency (and to some degree also from 
the “strategic hamlets” used by the U.S. in Vietnam).67  But unlike in the British in Malaya, the 
TNI never provided the resources to adequately support the displaced population.  The result was 
widespread and devastating famine and disease.  Where the British made a concerted effort to 
ameliorate the hardship of relocation and to “win hearts and minds,” the Timor example was 
more akin to a concentration camp.68  Once again, the TNI adopted the form of a new doctrine, 
but without implementing its underlying intent, context, and nuance.  
  
“A Spirit of Destruction”: The TNI’s Culture of Terror 
 The CAVR report estimates that between one-sixth to one-third of the Timorese 
population was killed as a direct result of the war.  In addition to the mass death, the 
overwhelming number of reports of indiscriminate killing, torture, sexual assault, 
disappearances, and other human rights violations indicate a pattern of behavior that was 
pervasive across the entire TNI, in what Geoffrey Robinson describes as “a culture of terror” 
(Robinson, Genocide 15).   
 Yet, Robinson also argues that “there is no evidence that the Indonesian army 
commanders who planned the operations in East Timor intended to kill one-third of the 
population,” and that it was instead an institutional culture of violence that had developed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     67 The success of the New Villages in the British anti-Communist counter-insurgency campaign was well 
publicized even during its time (although similar techniques have been used elsewhere), and after Konfrontasi, there 
were significant exchanges of training and cooperation between the TNI and Malaysian military forces.  
Additionally, General Benny Murdani, the chief architect of the invasion of East Timor, made several unofficial 
visits to South Vietnam in 1968 to review U.S. counter-insurgency operations.  See Conboy, Kopassus, 192-194.  
Nasution also mentions the Malayan insurgency in his Fundamentals, although the conflict was ongoing and it is 
unclear how much he knew about the British counter-insurgency tactics. 
     68 While the British COIN campaign also has many critics, and must be considered in relative terms, the strategic 
purpose behind the New Villages was not punitive, and the British managed to relocate a greater number of people 
than the TNI without resulting in famine and widespread death. 
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through the course of shared historical experiences, and perpetuated “through a process of 
socialization and indoctrination,” that shaped the attitudes and decisions of TNI soldiers at every 
level (46-49).  While every individual soldier is responsible for his actions, all soldiers are also 
the byproduct of the military institutional culture in which they have been trained.  And like 
soldiers in other historical armies that have perpetrated horrific levels of destruction and killing, 
TNI soldiers were “quintessentially ordinary men, driven by fear, propaganda, the brutalization 
of war, and self-preservation, but also by ties of family, political patronage, and institutional 
culture” (13).   
 In accounting, then, for the seemingly irreconcilable difference between the romantic 
ksatria values and self-image of the TNI, and the horrific brutality that they inflicted on the 
Timorese population, it is too simplistic to dismiss the former as empty rhetoric and claim the 
latter as indicating the true evil nature of Indonesian soldiers.  Indeed, TNI soldiers saw 
themselves as valorous patriots executing a mission on behalf of the Indonesian nation against 
Communist insurgents.  This kind of self-image is reflected in a hagiographic account of the East 
Timor invasion written by an Indonesian journalist who accompanied the TNI during Operation 
Seroja, which vilifies the brutality of FRETILIN and praises the professionalism of the TNI.  An 
anecdote is recounted by the author regarding the capture and treatment of Xavier Do Amaral, 
the first FRETILIN president, by BG Dading Kalbuadi, the ground commander of Operation 
Seroja and later Commander of the Regional Defense and Security of East Timor:   
Brigadier General Dading Kalbuadi who I asked to comment on his special 
treatment of Xavier, instead returned the question, “Hey, nDro,” (short for 
Hendro), “why should a captured enemy be killed.  Where is the essence of 
Pancasila in such act?” 
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When seen through the philosophy of a shadow puppet player, Brigadier 
General Dading’s attitude would reflect that of a begawan or satria pinandita, a 
knight who has risen to priestly status and is an example for all knights.  A 
begawan, with his great-skill and wise [sic] would only fight in battles with the 
principle of  “Menang datan ngasorake mungsuh” or “Victory without degrading 
the enemy.”  Xavier had been defeated, but his dignity was still intact. (Subroto 
255) 
 Leaving aside the rather fantastical nature of the story, how could such a chivalrous self-
perception in one important leader accord with the widespread pattern of human rights abuses for 
which the TNI became infamous in East Timor?   
 One answer is that the institutional acceptance of such violence was so deeply an 
ingrained norm that it no longer was seen in moral terms that would conflict with the self-
perception of virtuousness.  Extreme violence was no longer a moral issue, but rather simply an 
aspect of the kind of combat the TNI had been experiencing for decades, most recently during 
Indonesia’s paroxysm of violence in 1965-66.  The 1965-66 massacres have long been a 
suppressed memory in Indonesia, until recently never discussed, its details occupying an 
invisible chapter in the New Order history books.  Yet that bloody affair, in which as many as a 
million people were killed under the guise of an anti-Communist purge, would have imprinted an 
indelible mark on the entire generation of TNI soldiers who invaded East Timor in 1975, many 
of whom would have been participants less than a decade prior.  Kai Thaler, in an essay 
comparing the 1965-66 killings with the violence unleashed in East Timor, notes the continuity 
in the kind of violence between the two events: “Patterns of rape and massacre learned and used 
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during the Killings were embedded in the institutional repertoire of the Indonesian military and 
state, then applied to East Timor” (217).   
 Yet, while there is little historical detail on the kind of violence conducted in the TNI’s 
previous conflicts, some of what exists suggest that, like other ingrained elements of the 
military’s culture, the TNI’s patterns of extreme violence go back even further to its genesis.  As 
William H. Frederick discusses in an essay about the “savage violence Indonesians leveled 
against their own countrymen” during the revolution (and the dearth of scholarly research on it), 
such extreme violence as “beheading, torturing, and burning or burying alive” tended to be 
accepted to some degree as a natural wartime phenomenon (Frederick 146, 152).  Extreme 
violence was not necessarily perceived in ethical terms, but in a relative and instrumental way: 
In the revolutionary circumstances, extreme violence tended to be seen in 
practical terms before moral ones. It appears to have been understood as a 
‘natural’ social force, one which could not be weighed in absolute terms of ‘good’ 
and ‘evil,’ and one which could not be controlled by simple eradication.  Neither 
the violence itself nor its use were necessarily immoral, and the roots and sources 
of the violence need have nothing to do with the uses to which it was put.  
(Frederick 157)   
 
This does not justify such violence, or imply that all violence was viewed as such. Rather, it 
helps to explain that there was a deeply rooted institutional acceptance of extreme violence in 
TNI, one conditioned by the repeated instances of bloody conflict that the TNI had participated 
in through its history.   
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 In East Timor, violence was again an intrinsic and accepted means to an end.  The 
following are excerpts from a TNI command’s instructions in East Timor, dated July 1982, 
detailing interrogation procedures:  
Military Regional Command XVI, Udayana  
Established Procedure for the Interrogation of Prisoners.  
PROTAP/01-B/VII/1982  
(From Part I—Introduction): 
As soon as these prisoners are taken, the information obtained must be quickly 
processed as part of data-gathering activity.  Data-gathering activity requires the 
skill or ability to interrogate people so that correct conclusions can be drawn 
about where the GPK leaders or units are hiding.  Incorrect data gathering 
methods will lead to wrong conclusions and will result in sending our troops in 
the wrong direction.  
(From Part V—Things That Must be Avoided): 
13. The use of violence and threats.  
Hopefully, interrogation accompanied by the use of violence will not take place 
except in certain circumstances when the person being interrogated is having 
difficulty telling the truth (is evasive).  
If it proves necessary to use violence, make sure that there are no people 
around (members of TBO, Hansip, Ratih or other people) to see what is 
happening, so as not to arouse people’s antipathy.  The use of violence often 
results in the person under interrogation being forced to admit guilt because of 
fear, and thereafter he/she will just comply with all the wishes of the interrogator.  
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Avoid taking photographs showing torture in progress (people being 
photographed at times when they are being subjected to electric current, when 
they have been stripped naked, etc).  Remember not to have such photographic 
documentation developed outside, in Den Pasar, which could then be made 
available to the public by irresponsible elements.  
It is better to make attractive photographs, such as shots taken while eating 
together with the prisoner, or shaking hands with those who have just come down 
from the bush, showing them in front of a house, and so on. If such photos are 
circulated in the bush, this is a classic way of assuredly undermining their morale 
and fighting spirits. And if such photos are shown to the priests, this can draw the 
church into supporting operations to restore security.  (Budiarjo and Liong 233-
236) 
If this remarkable sample of an official TNI document discussing torture can be taken as 
representative, it highlights two main points.  The first is that torture was officially sanctioned 
and was a consciously accepted practice.  The second is the pragmatic terms with which the 
document outlines torture.  It is simply one means of “data gathering” that “hopefully” would not 
need to be used, but would be necessitated in the vague event that the detainee was “having 
difficulty telling the truth.”  Torture is described as an instrument that needed to be employed 
correctly in order to achieve its purpose, with complete indifference to its morality.  Of course, 
every military force to some degree desensitizes the violence conducted by its members.  The 
difference is that modern Western militaries place explicit limits on the extent of acceptable 
violence, even if they are sometimes violated.  The TNI may have acquired the tools of modern 
militaries such as the U.S., but not its values. 
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 This tendency towards the normalization of the extreme can also be seen as a result of the 
TNI’s long evolution of increasing autonomy from civilian oversight.  The conflict between 
Indonesia’s military and civilian elites came to its apotheosis and abrupt end in the 1965 Coup 
attempt and subsequent purge in which the New Order was born.  The trajectory from that event 
to East Timor is clear.  The New Order government’s embodiment of the military’s doctrine—of 
its right and obligation to involvement in every facet of civic life—bolstered the tendency 
towards extreme violence.  As Geoffrey Robinson notes: 
Where states are dominated by military institutions, the likelihood of mass 
violence increases dramatically. That pattern stems partly from the fact that in 
such regimes, the military tends to have broad autonomy and to exist beyond the 
control of other state institutions. In those circumstances, commanding officers—
and other authorities—commonly fail to control or punish unlawful or 
exceptionally brutal behavior. That failure invariably leads to a climate of 
impunity, which in turn makes future unlawful violence far more likely to occur. 
These general patterns are arguably compounded in the context of war, partly 
because of war’s brutalizing effects on soldiers and civilians alike, and partly 
because it provides both the opportunity and rationale for the use of extreme 
violence.  In such contexts, furthermore, military and police forces—and their 
proxies—frequently develop distinctive institutional cultures that can make the 
resort to unlawful violence by their members more likely. (Robinson, Genocide 
15) 
Following this trajectory, we can see that a new generation of soldiers was acculturated to the 
TNI’s institutional norms through their experiences in East Timor.  The destruction wrought by 
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the TNI and its proxy militias on Indonesia’s withdrawal in 1999 shows that the “transfer of 
values” from Generasi ’45 to the new generation had indeed continued.   
 An irony of the TNI’s occupation of East Timor is that in many ways, it mimicked the 
colonial experience that Indonesia had undergone in its own pre-independence history.  Much of 
the same rhetoric of bringing civilization, modernization, and stability to East Timor infuses TNI 
accounts of the conflict.  TNI soldiers viewed their mission as a heroic one, embodying the 
revolutionary spirit of Generasi ’45.  Kathleen McGregor, in History in Uniform: Military 
Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia’s Past, recounts a conversation with a TNI officer 
who “revealed to me that during his experience as Field Commander in East Timor he would 
often recite stories of Sudirman in order to lift the morale of his troops” (139).  Despite the fact 
that “the [Timorese] resistance leaders bore greater similarities to Sudirman as a guerrilla fighter, 
while [they] could be compared to the better-armed colonialists,” for many of the TNI soldiers 
“this irony was not apparent” (139).   
 Nasution’s post-revolution observation that the guerrilla’s tactic of “scorched earth is 
aimed at destroying the whole existing religious, legal, socio-economic order which forms the 
organization of the dominating power” was borne out again in East Timor.  But here it was the 
TNI that was paradoxically both the dominating power and the executor of scorched earth 
guerrilla tactics.  Despite its formal resemblance to an evolved modern military, the TNI’s 
ingrained habits and underlying beliefs expressed themselves in the same tendency towards 
unbounded violence that had been its characteristic since the Indonesian revolution.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The origin of a military, the way it has been collectively trained and educated, matters a 
great deal in determining the kind of identity it will assume.  In attempting to account for the 
often-troubling characteristics of the TNI throughout its history, this thesis has sought to trace 
the TNI’s institutional culture to its roots in the formation of PETA.  The PETA-trained 
generation of officers who controlled the TNI for over three decades were inculcated with a 
unique mixture of revolutionary nationalism, guerrilla warfare training, and a belief in the power 
of semangat to triumph over steel.  In other words, the Japanese had trained an army of 
guerrillas, but not soldiers in a professional sense.  Formed as a revolutionary guerrilla army, this 
identity was reinforced during the war for independence.  The war also ingrained normative 
patterns of extreme violence that would be reinforced over the succeeding decades in numerous 
internal conflicts, reaching a peak in the 1965-66 killings, and again in the 1975 invasion of East 
Timor. 
 The central tension within the TNI’s culture is the incongruence between its deep-rooted 
identity as a guerrilla warfare force, and the requirements inherent in its role as the national army 
of a modernizing country.  These conflicting impulses were institutionalized during the New 
Order, when the military largely adopted the tactics and equipment of the U.S., but continued to 
operate based on an underlying military culture rooted in its guerrilla past.  In its invasion and 
occupation of East Timor, the TNI demonstrated patterns of behavior that continued to harken 
back to 1965, and 1945, while in the guise of a military operating with a modern structure and 
modern equipment. 
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 Aside from the training provided to Indonesians in PETA, the parallels between the IJA 
and the TNI are striking, and possibly offer a source for deeper comparison in the future.  Some 
elements were clearly transmitted, such as the reliance on semangat in a resource poor army to 
compensate for the lack of material power.  In both countries, the military was never fully under 
civilian control and contested power within the government, in both cases becoming the 
dominant authority.  This led to lack of civilian oversight of its conduct and cultures of military 
impunity, particularly in expeditionary wars such as in Manchuria and East Timor.  In both 
cases, years of brutal counter-guerrilla warfare conditioned and habituated both armies to 
increasing levels of acceptable violence that spiraled into the extreme.  These self-reinforcing 
norms were highlighted respectively in the assaults on Nanking and East Timor.   
 In seeking to connect the TNI’s institutional culture to the IJA, I acknowledge many 
limitations in this thesis.  First and foremost is that this thesis relies largely on correlations, 
parallels, and suggestive patterns in order to support its argument.  A prime example of this is 
my attempt to suggest a link between the kinds of extreme violence notoriously perpetrated by 
the IJA, and the similar kinds of violence conducted by the Indonesian army in subsequent 
decades.  There is no proof that the IJA taught their PETA recruits any methods of torture or the 
like.  In fact, a related problem is the dearth of historical documentation on the nature of violence 
conducted by Indonesian Republican forces during the revolution or in subsequent campaigns69.  
However, even a less contentious suggestion, that the IJA’s views on the military’s role in 
government were passed on to the Indonesian PETA recruits (a suggestion also made by 
Benedict Anderson, among others), relies mostly on the suggestive historical parallels between 
the two armies’ relationships with their respective governments.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     69 A topic addressed by William Frederick, "Shadows of an Unseen Hand," in Colombijn and Lindblad, 2002. 
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 Indeed, in describing the roots of a culture of extreme violence within the TNI, I have 
intentionally narrowed my focus to military actions, and limited my study to the origins of the 
military in PETA.  This has been in order to focus on the military as an instrument of state 
violence, which in this case overtook the state.  This neglects the growing body of scholarship on 
the deeper “roots of violence” in Indonesia which highlights other historical and cultural 
complexions, such as the Javanese traditions of the jago (local strongman and/or thief) and 
preman (local thug/vigilante), Dutch colonial mass killings and internal policing measures, or 
“gangster revolutionaries.”70   
 Additionally, a critic might point out that this thesis rests largely on two incidents that I 
use to demonstrate the conditioning of the TNI’s attitudes toward violence—the revolution and 
the 1965-66 killings—and in both cases the violence perpetrated was not by the military alone, 
but by large swaths of society.  This is a valid point, and these were national “trauma learning” 
events, not restricted to the military.  Yet, in both cases the military played a special role as the 
focal source of the violence, bearing the greatest responsibility for the outcome.  And while 
individuals and gangs dispersed back into society after these events, the military institutionalized 
the lessons of this violence, reinforcing these extreme norms in its veterans and socializing its 
new members into the military culture, and ensuring its perpetuation into the future.  Although 
this thesis ends with the consolidation of TNI forces in East Timor, roughly contemporaneous 
with the retirement of the last of the PETA generation officers, it is clear from subsequent TNI 
actions in East Timor, as well as in Indonesia proper, that the culture of extreme violence and 
impunity had not ended.    
 Of course, any national military is made up of members of its own society, who bring 
with them values and beliefs common to the culture.  This is especially so in a self-professed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     70 Refers to Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries.  
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guerrilla army, in which, as Nasution repeatedly exhorts, the army acts in unity with the people.  
Yet, there is a danger, too, in the kinds of norms that are institutionalized in a former guerrilla 
army.  Militaries tend naturally to be closed cultures, appropriate for their specialized task in 
managing the official monopoly on killing and organized mass violence.  In most modern armies, 
the military culture helps to both enable its members to conduct violence, as well as to strictly 
limit violence and control its form and extent.  This is predicated, however, on the norm of 
acceptable violence.  In the case of the TNI, its origins as a guerrilla militia army conditioned an 
attitude toward unbounded violence that became a part of its military culture.    
 Although the TNI’s institutional culture developed in circumstances unique to  
Indonesia, its experience as a revolutionary guerrilla army that became a national military is 
certainly not a singular one.  From wars of decolonization, to separatist movements, and civil 
wars and revolutions worldwide, wars of the weak against the strong continue to reshape nations 
around the globe.  These wars tend to be brutal in the total violence inflicted by both sides, 
scarring the population and the combatants for decades.  In many cases, these guerrilla armies for 
independence, often supported by outside powers, become national armies themselves.  
Sometimes, these new national armies of ex-guerrillas continue to be trained by the armies of 
foreign powers.  History shows us that the ideals upon which many of these independence 
movements come to power can quickly be usurped by chaos and instability, and a return to 
internecine violence.  But it also suggests that institutional culture can, in fact, be transmitted or 
at least influenced, by external organizations through deep or sustained contact.  In the case of 
PETA, many of the IJA's values became the TNI's values.  And in spite of the problematic 
characteristics of the TNI's institutional culture, the corollary point is that positive values can 
also be ingrained.  Perhaps what can be made from all this is that in the case of supporting new 
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armies, simply providing the tools for violence is not enough to mitigate unintended outcomes.  
And the way in which armies are trained and educated from their origin, and by whom and how, 
matters a great deal in ensuring that freedom fighters do not become the new oppressors.  
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